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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. 
FAMILY INTER VIVOS 
REVOCABLE TRUST; LARUE 
FISHER, individually; 
LARUE FISHER, trustee and 
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE 
FISHER, 
Defendants, Appellees 
and Cross Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from the final judgment of Judge A. Lynn 
Payne, Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchense County. The 
jurisdiction originally lay in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). On February 3, 1995 this case was 
transferred to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), 
and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3. 
1 
Case No: 950089-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In addition to the Statement of Issues presented by the 
Appellants, Cross-Appellants (hereinafter "Max and Joyce" or 
"Defendants") present the following issues and standards of review 
to this Court: 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GEORGE FISHER JR. MADE AN ORAL 
AGREEMENT WITH MAX FISHER, POSTPONING PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE ESCROW 
AGREEMENT/ WHEN THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MLNDS AS TO THE TERMS OF THE 
ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT. 
The trial court found that an oral agreement, entered into by 
both George and Max Fisher modified the original escrow agreement. 
R. at 254 L. 8-13. To the degree that this was a factual 
finding, great deference is accorded to the finding of the trial 
court. Therefore, a trial court's finding must be "clearly 
erroneous" before an appellate court will overrule it. A person 
challenging a factual issue must "marshal all the evidence" to 
establish that the trial court's factual finding was clearly 
erroneous. Slattery v. Covey & Co. . 857 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993); 
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577 (Utah App. 1993); Utah R. C. 
P. 52(a) . 
Plaintiffs' requested standard of review on this issue (non-
deferential review) is unfounded. The criminal case cited by 
Plaintiffs does not apply to contractual intent or payment 
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agreements such as the one at bar, nor does it support Plaintiffs' 
requested standard of review on this issue. State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). Whether a party had contractual intent 
is a question of fact requiring a marshaling of the evidence. 
Fitzgerald v. Carbide, 793 P. 2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990) . Furthermore, 
the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that whether an 
agreement existed between parties as to how to pay a debt is a 
factual issue requiring the clearly erroneous standard. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel, v. Sohm. 755 P.2d 144, 158-59 (Utah 1988). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE 
MAJORITY OF YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT WHEN 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PURSUE ACTION WITHIN THE SIX-YEAR STATUTORY PERIOD. 
Defendants raised the statute of limitations both by way of 
counterclaim (R. at 25) and in opposition to a motion to dismiss 
brought by Plaintiff. R. at 107. This issue was also extensively 
argued before the court and in Defendants' Trial Memorandum. R. at 
216. In finding an oral modification of the contract, the trial 
court avoided ruling on the statute of limitations. R. at 254 L. 
10-14. Whether the statute of limitations has expired is a 
question of law. Gramlich v. Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 
1992); Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts.. 858 P.2d 184, 186 
(Utah App. 1993). An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
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conclusions of law in civil cases for correctness and given no 
deference. Id. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF 
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THIS CASE WHEN GEORGE FISHER TOLD MAX AND 
JOYCE FISHER NOT TO MAKE THE YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS AND MAX AND JOYCE 
ACTED IN RELIANCE UPON GEORGE • s REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 
19 YEARS WITHOUT REPRISAL? 
The equitable defenses of laches, waiver and estoppel were 
raised in Max and Joyce's answer and more fully argued in their 
opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in their 
trial memorandum. R. at 25-26; R. 111-115; R.213-216. Whether a 
legal or equitable doctrine should be applied to a particular 
factual situation allows a discretionary ruling by the trial court. 
State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d at 936-39. The degree of deference 
allotted to the trial court's decision varies given the facts and 
legal issues involved in the decision. id. Until an appellate 
court has determined that a particular fact situation does or does 
not satisfy the legal standard at issue, the trial court has 
discretion to venture into that area and make a ruling. id. In 
this case, the trial court made specific findings of fact but did 
not address the laches and estoppel issues, even though these 
issues had been thoroughly briefed and argued before the court. 
Therefore, this Court should review the trial court's refusal to 
address these issues under the abuse of discretion standard. 
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The trial court did, however, rule that under the facts 
presented at trial, George Fisher did not waive his right to 
collect payment but merely agreed to extend the payment period for 
an indefinite time period. R. at 252 L. 18-19. A finding of 
intentional waiver under certain specified facts is a question of 
law, and the trial court's conclusion should be given no deference 
and reviewed for correctness. Soter's v. Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Utah 1993). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FORFEITURE WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND 
THIS FINDING SHOULD BE UPHELD BOTH BECAUSE IT IS WELL GROUNDED IN TESTIMONY 
AND EVIDENCE AND AS A MATTER OP LAW. 
The trial court found that it was "extremely unjust" to allow 
George to instruct the buyers, Max and Joyce Fisher, not to make 
payments and then allow a forfeiture based upon reliance of the 
buyers in not making payments. R at 252 L. 22-23. A trial court's 
findings of fact will not be set aside on the appeal unless clearly 
erroneous. This clearly erroneous standard is also applicable in 
equity cases. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). 
In Bellon, also a forfeiture case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a trial court's determination of whether forfeiture is equitable is 
a question of fact and must be accorded great deference, id. See 
also Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) (holding 
that the same standard that applies to a trial court's finding of 
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fact applies also to a trial courts equitable findings); Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 n. 1 (Utah 1987) (A trial court's finding 
of a constructive trust is an equitable finding which should be 
afforded the clearly erroneous standard). An appellate court will 
uphold an equitable finding by the trial court unless the great 
weight of the evidence mandates another conclusion. Bountiful, 784 
P. 2d at 1175. Therefore, the party wishing to have the trial 
court's finding overturned must marshal all the evidence to support 
that position. Id. 
V. IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MODIFIED , THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
CONCLUDING THAT INTEREST CONTINUED TO ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT PRINCIPLE WHEN 
ALL THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT CONTINUED ACCRUAL WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED BY 
THE PARTIES , GEORGE FISHER DID NOT EXPECT INTEREST TO ACCRUE AND THE 
PAYMENTS WERE WAIVED BY BOTH GEORGE AND LARUE FISHER. 
The trial court's finding that the parties agreed to allow 
interest to accrue on the contract is a finding of fact which the 
Court reviews for clear error, and the party challenging the 
finding must marshal all the evidence to prove the error. R. at 
258. Inasmuch as the trial court found that the parties orally-
agreed that interest to continue to accrue on the principal this is 
a factual finding. However, the record shows that Plaintiffs 
waived collection of interest. As discussed, above, a finding of 
intentional waiver under certain specified facts is a question of 
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aw and the trial court's conclusion should be given no deference 
and reviewed for correctness. Soters, 857 P.2d at 940-941. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
In addition to the statute of frauds discussed in Plaintiffs1 
brief, the statute of limitations as specified in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-23(2) (1984) will be at issue in the determination of this 
case. This statute reads: "Within six years: . . . (2) An action 
upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22." 
Section 78-12-22 has no applicability to this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 1, 1975, George and LaRue Fisher, husband and 
wife, conveyed approximately 600 acres to their son Max Fisher and 
his wife, Joyce, pursuant to a written escrow agreement. R. at 
250 L. 5. The purchase price was $124,000, and Max and Joyce paid 
$8,280 as a down payment. R. at 250 L. 6. The contract called for 
yearly annual payments of $10,000 due May first and beginning in 
1975. Interest was payable at the annual rate of 5 percent and 
specifically included in the annual payments. R. at 250 L. 6. Max 
and Joyce entered into possession of the property on or about May 
1, 1974, and they have remained in possession since then. Id. A 
full copy of this escrow agreement is attached hereto as addendum 
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"A" and adopted into these facts by reference. 
During the term of the agreement, the parties had several 
discussions concerning the annual payments. The first discussion, 
which was prior to the first annual payment becoming due, concerned 
whether Max and Joyce should make the payments. R. at 251 L. 15-
16. At that time, George told Max that he should not make his 
payment but should invest the money by improving the property. R. 
251 L. 19-20. George indicated that he did not need the money and 
that any money Max paid him would go to the I.R.S. R. at 3 94 L. 
14-16; R. 342 L. 13-16. He then told Max that he would notify him 
when he should begin making payments. R. 251 at L. 21-22 R. 394 
L.15-16. 
In 1979, Max and Joyce sold $82,980 in cattle. During a 
conversation with George, Max and Joyce offered the entire amount 
to him as payment on the property. R.412-19. George again 
responded that he did not need nor want the money due to tax 
consequences and instructed them to reinvest the money into the 
property, id. See Addendum C. Max insisted that his father take 
some of the proceeds, so George consented and took approximately 
$24,980 as payment on the property. id. ; R. at 257 at 4-5. 
Again in 1980 or 1981, Max and George had another discussion 
concerning the payments. Again George instructed Max not to make 
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payments to him but to continue to invest the installment payments 
into improving the property. R. at 252 L. 8-11. 
In 1988 or 1989, the home which had been on the property when 
it was purchased became unusable because of a cracked foundation, 
so it became necessary for Max and Joyce to either build or rent a 
home. R. at 252 L. 13-14. Max and Joyce spoke to George about 
this problem and indicated that they would either have to build a 
home on the property or purchase a home off of the property. 
George instructed them to build a new home, telling them once again 
not to worry about the annual payments and that he would not 
request the payments. R. at 252 L. 15-16. Relying upon George's 
statement, Max and Joyce built a new home and financed it by 
pledging their cattle and equipment as security. R. at 252 L. 17-
18. Max and Joyce continue to be liable for the mortgage on the 
home that is now approximately $30,000. R. at 252 L. 17-18. 
In reliance upon their discussions with George, Max and Joyce 
also invested their money into other improvements on the property 
rather than making the annual payments during the entire period of 
the loan agreement. R. at 252 L. 1-2. During that time, Max and 
Joyce built a new home and other buildings, installed sprinkling 
systems, cleared the land, and made numerous improvements to the 
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roperty which substantially increased the land's value. R. at 257 
at 6-15. 
During, the life of the loan and until after George Fisher's 
death (approximately one year after the last payment was due) , 
neither George nor his wife LaRue, Plaintiff in this case, made any 
attempt to enforce the terms of the escrow agreement. R. at 252 L. 
19-20. Furthermore, if there was any disagreement with her 
husband about the status of the sale of the farm to Max and Joyce, 
instead of taking any independent action, Joyce acquiesced to the 
will of her husband. R. at 255 L. 10-12. Finally, the record 
clearly demonstrates that LaRue Fisher did not ask for any payment 
on the loan until after George Fisher had passed away. R. at 254 
L. 1-2. 
Plaintiffs sent the first documented demand from plaintiffs in 
this matter to Max and Joyce on or about March 5, 1994. This 
correspondence, purporting to be a "Notice of Termination of 
Agreement" requested that Max and Joyce pay in full, but never 
specified the amount needed to rectify any alleged breach. 
Furthermore, Max and Joyce had no way of ascertaining this amount 
as the Plaintiffs failed to notify the escrow agent specified in 
the Escrow Agreement of the amount demanded. A copy of this 
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Notice of Termination of Agreement" is attached hereto as addendum 
"B" and adopted into these facts by reference. 
Considering the above facts, the trial court found that an 
oral modification of the contract occurred between the parties. In 
ruling that this modification took place, the court also found that 
Max and George agreed that interest would continue to accrue on the 
principal until paid. The only evidence presented regarding 
whether interest would accrue was the testimony of James J. Oman. 
Mr. Oman testified that in a conversation between himself, George 
and LaRue he heard George state on two occasions that "fI don't 
think we should charge interest on it.1" R. at 526 L. 17. 
Defendants have been unable to find any other testimony or evidence 
presented to the trial court on this issue. 
The trial court also found that from the date the first 
payment became due under the Escrow Agreement and at all times 
thereafter, Max and Joyce either had the money to make the annual 
payment or they could obtain the money from their bank whenever a 
payment was due. R. at 251 L. 18. Finally, the trial court found 
that under the above stated facts, forfeiture would be inequitable. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs correctly assert that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in ruling that there was an oral modification of the 
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original Escrow Agreement. In Utah, the statute of frauds 
contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1, 3, and 4, prohibits any oral 
modification of a contract for the purchase of real property. The 
trial court violated the statute of frauds in finding an oral 
modification and should have looked solely to the four corners of 
the Escrow Agreement in determining the rights of the parties in 
this case. Plaintiffs' only remedies in this case are those they 
are legally entitled to under the Escrow Agreement. 
In Utah, an action brought to enforce the terms of a written 
instrument must be brought within six years from the date of 
default in order to collect judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
23(2). As a general rule, a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action. With installment contracts the cause of action ripens when 
the buyer fails to make a scheduled installment payment. 
In the present case, plaintiff LaRue Fisher and Defendants' 
entered into an installment contract in which payments were due on 
an annual basis. However, after George told Max and Joyce not to 
pay, no payments were accepted or requested by either him or LaRue 
for over 19 years. After George's death in 1992, his wife LaRue 
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made the first request for payment under the Escrow Agreement and 
in June of the following year initiated this action. 
Plaintiffs' claims for payment under the Escrow Agreement 
accrued individually with each payment's due date, beginning on May 
1, 1975 and continuing annually until May 1, 1992 when the final 
payment of $7,717.96 was due and owing. Since this action was not 
initiated until June 1993, the statute of limitations time bars all 
claims arising prior to June 1987 (June 1993 minus six years). 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are only legally entitled to recover the 
amounts specified under the Escrow Agreement for the six years not 
barred by the statute of limitations (i.e., 1988--$10,000; 1989--
$10,000; 1990--$10,000; 1991--$10,000 ; and 1992--$7,717.96) , 
totaling $47,717.96. 
As to the remaining amount, or in the alternative, if the 
statute of limitations does not apply as stated above, the 
equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel and laches should be 
applied to the facts of this case. Waiver is an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. The facts in this case are clear 
that on numerous occasions, George, with either the consent or 
acquiescence of his wife, instructed Max and Joyce not to pay the 
annual installment payments required under the Escrow Agreement. 
Based upon these requests, Max and Joyce reinvested the monies due 
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under the contract to improve the subject property. Accordingly, 
George and LaRue intentionally relinquished their right to collect 
the payments due under the Escrow Agreement. 
Furthermore, a party may be equitably estopped from asserting 
a right to which he was legally entitled if by his actions he 
induces another to take action which will result in the second 
parties' harm. In the present case, George informed Max on several 
occasions that he did not need the money due under the Escrow 
Agreement and that he would tell Max when to resume making the 
payments. By not collecting these payments, George and LaRue 
benefited because of the tax consequences of not acquiring the 
extra income. Conversely, Max and Joyce, in reliance upon their 
father's representations, reinvested the annual payments into 
permanent improvements upon the property that will be forfeited 
with the property. Were this Court to allow Plaintiffs the relief 
sought, they would receive a double benefit from their actions, 
denying Defendants many benefit from the past 19 years of their 
labor. Not only have Plaintiffs received the tax benefits from the 
non-payments, but if allowed to recover the property, they would 
receive the property which has greatly increased in economic value 
due to Max and Joyce's reinvestment into the property. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs would receive the monies already paid on 
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the property and the new property improvements including the new 
home. Therefore, this Court should find that Plaintiffs actions or 
actions taken in Plaintiffs' behalf and Defendants' subsequent 
reliance to their detriment upon these action should estop 
Plaintiffs from obtaining forfeiture and the amounts not barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
Additionally, laches is an equitable defense that denies 
relief to one who has been guilty of unconscionable delay that 
would result in damages to one claiming the defense. Laches 
applies whether or not there are applicable statutes of 
limitations. In the present case, Plaintiffs have made no demand 
under the terms of the Escrow Agreement for approximately 19 years. 
The Utah legislature has proclaimed that six years is ample time in 
which to bring an action based upon a written agreement. This 
action to recover annual payments under the Escrow Agreement since 
1975 was brought more that three times the length of time allotted 
in the statute of limitations. Review of the Utah Code suggests 
that 19 years is more than double any statutes of limitations in 
this state. This court should find as a matter of law that failure 
to act for 19 years is an unreasonable delay for any contract 
claim. 
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Furthermore, the trial court found that to grant Plaintiffs 
the desired relief under the escrow agreement, would irreparably 
harm Max and Joyce. Defendants have relied upon George Fisher's 
representations that he did not want payment under the terms of the 
Escrow Agreement and because of those representations, Max and 
Joyce put money into other investments. The trial court even found 
that as each individual payment became due, Max and Joyce could 
meet the payment obligations. Now, however, it would be an extreme 
burden upon them to require Max and Joyce to require all payments 
to be paid at once. Subsequently, Plaintiffs have requested 
forfeiture based upon Max and Joyce's actions taken in reliance 
upon George's requests. Were forfeiture to be granted, Plaintiffs 
would benefit from the vast improvements made to the property at 
the detriment to Max and Joyce. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have raised many challenges to the factual 
findings of the trail court. It is well established that a party 
challenging a trial court's factual finding must marshal all the 
evidence to show that the lower court's findings were clearly in 
error. Once the evidence has been marshaled, the challenging party 
has a duty to show how the facts found by the lower court were 
legally insufficient. 
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Here, Plaintiffs have failed to both properly marshal the 
evidence and to show how the trial court's findings were legally 
insufficient. Therefore, this Court should deny Plaintiffs1 
requested relief on their challenges to the court's factual 
findings. 
If this Court chooses to disregard the above law and uphold 
the trial court's finding of an oral modification, it should 
overturn the trial court's finding that the parties mutually agreed 
that interest should continue to accrue. First, the evidence does 
not support such a finding and furthermore, Plaintiffs have waived 
collection of interest by action and words. Therefore, this court 
should overturn the trial courts ruling on this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GEORGE FISHER J R . MADE AN ORAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE ESCROW AGREEMENT WITH MAX FISHER, POSTPONING PAYMENTS 
DUE UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s t a t u t e of f r a u d s a rguments t h a t P l a i n t i f f s 
have d e l i n e a t e d i n t h e i r b r i e f , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o o r a l l y modi fy t h e t e r m s of t h e Escrow Agreement 
i s a l s o i n e r r o r due t o a f a i l u r e of t h e p a r t i e s t o come t o a 
" m e e t i n g of t h e minds" i n r e g a r d s t o t h e e s s e n t i a l t e r m s of t h e 
a g r e e m e n t . The p a r t i e s t o a c o n t r a c t may, by mutua l c o n s e n t , a l t e r 
a l l o r any p o r t i o n of t h a t c o n t r a c t by a g r e e i n g upon a m o d i f i c a t i o n 
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thereof.1 Western Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah 
Ap. 1988). However, under basic contract law principles, a 
contract is not formed without a meeting of the minds. 
"Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the 
same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the 
essential terms." Id. 
In order for a court to find a contract modification under 
this principle, it must find two necessary elements. First, there 
must be a meeting of the minds of all parties to the contract. 
Then, once the court finds that the parties mutually agreed to a 
modification, the court must find that all essential terms were 
agreed upon. Id. 
Deciding whether the specific terms omitted were essential to 
the agreement requires an examination of the entire agreement and 
the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into. Id. 
Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the courts only if the 
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient 
definiteness. When the parties leave material matters so obscure 
and undefined that the court cannot say whether the minds of the 
1The parties to the escrow agreement were Max and Joyce Fisher and George 
and LaRue Fisher. The trial court found, however, under the circumstances of 
this case, Joyce and LaRue allowed their husbands to conduct the business without 
objection and were therefore bound by their husband's actions. 
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parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms 
they agreed, the court should not enforce the contract. Southland 
Corp. v. Pott. 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988). 
The trial court in this case sua sponte ruled that the parties 
orally agreed to modify the contract. Specifically, the court 
ruled that the parties mutually "agreed to delay payments until the 
seller requested payments." The parties did not agree how long 
this modification would last, they did not discuss whether interest 
would continue to accrue, and they did not discuss what would be 
due once George decided to request payments. These issues are very 
material to the rights and duties of the parties. The failure of 
the parties to come to a meeting of the minds on these crucial 
issues precludes the finding of an oral modification of the terms 
of the Escrow Agreement and the trial courts finding on this issue 
must be overturned. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE 
MAJORITY OF YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT WHEN 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PURSUE ACTION WITHIN THE SIX YEAR PERIOD. 
In Utah, an action brought to enforce the terms of a written 
instrument must be brought within six years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-23(2). Statutes of limitations were designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims 
allowed to "slumber until evidence is lost, memories have faded and 
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witnesses have disappeared." Becton, Dickinson & Co v. Reese, 668 
P.2d. 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) . To further this purpose, the general 
rule has been that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of 
the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Becton, 
668 P.2d at 1257; United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co. et al. . 870 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1993) . With installment 
contracts, the cause of action ripens when the buyer fails to make 
a scheduled installment payment. Moab Nat. Bank v. Keystone-
Wallace Resources. 517 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Utah 1973); Buell v. 
Duchesne Merc. Co.. 231 P. 123, 124-25 (Utah 1924). In Moab Nat. 
Bank the Utah Supreme Court held that "while the entire note was 
not due and payable, nevertheless, the plaintiff could 
have commenced an action to recover the past due installment and 
that the statute of limitations would commence to run against the 
installment." 517 P.2d at 1023. 
This case presents a classic example of the inequities the 
statute of limitations was designed to prevent. This contract was 
entered into between parents and son in May of 1974 for the 
purchase of 600 acres of ranching property. Yearly installments of 
$10,000 were due on the first day of May of each subsequent year 
until paid in full. Following this agreement, George Fisher told 
his son that "he did not then need the money and that Max should 
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continue to improve the property." R. at 251 L. 19-20. In 
reliance upon his father's representations, Max and Joyce, who had 
the money to make the payment, made substantial improvements to the 
property, complying with George's desires. R. at 251-252. 
No demand for payment, either from George or LaRue, was ever 
made upon Max and Joyce until March 5, 1993, one year after George 
had passed away. Infact, over 19 years had passed before the 
sellers even chose to enforce the terms of the installment 
contract, and the record is clear that Max and Joyce did not avoid 
payment on the contract. Instead, the trial court found that they 
were able to pay at all times but did not do so due to the 
representations that George did not want the payments because of 
tax consequences. George preferred that Max and Joyce invest the 
money until he requested it, and they did as requested without any 
objection from LaRue. R. at 251 L. 15-16, 18; R. 252 L. 8-11. 
Now, 19 years after the initial payments were due, LaRue 
Fisher attempts to enforce the contract terms as originally 
written. This situation is exactly what the statute of limitations 
was designed to prevent. Since the first cause of action accrued, 
and for the past 18 years, evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded and an essential witness and party to the contract has died. 
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Because t h i s a c t i o n was commenced i n June of 1993 , i f t h i s 
c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e s of w a i v e r , e s t o p p e l and 
l a c h e s do no t b a r a l l of P l a i n t i f f s 1 c l a i m s h e r e , t h i s Cour t s h o u l d 
a p p l y t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s and deny P l a i n t i f f s ' r e c o v e r y f o r 
a l l payments t h a t became due u n d e r t h e Escrow Agreement b e f o r e June 
1987 . 2 
I I I . THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF 
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, AND LACHES IN THIS CASE WHEN GEORGE FISHER TOLD DEFENDANT 
NOT TO MAKE THE YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS AND DEFENDANT ACTED I N RELIANCE 
UPON THESE REPRESENTATIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 YEARS WITHOUT REPRISAL. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , which p r e v e n t s 
p l a i n t i f f s from r e c o v e r i n g a l l c l a i m s excep t $47,717.96% d e f e n d a n t s 
h a v e s e v e r a l e q u i t a b l e a r g u m e n t s which s h o u l d p r o h i b i t P l a i n t i f f 
from any mone ta ry r e c o v e r y i n t h i s c a s e . 
A. Waiver 
The e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e of w a i v e r i s d e f i n e d a s t h e i n t e n t i o n a l 
r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a known r i g h t . "To c o n s t i t u t e w a i v e r , t h e r e must 
be an e x i s t i n g r i g h t , b e n e f i t o r a d v a n t a g e , a knowledge of i t s 
e x i s t e n c e , and an i n t e n t i o n t o r e l i n q u i s h i t . " S o t e r ' s I n c . v . 
2Under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, Defendants were t o make $10,000 
payments each May 1, beginning 1975. The f i n a l payments of $7,717.96 became due 
on May 1, 1992. If t h i s Court f inds t h a t waiver, e s toppe l and l aches do not 
app ly , a t a maximum P l a i n t i f f s should only be awarded $47,717.96 for t he 
payments which became due a f t e r June 1987. ($10,000--May 1, 1988; $10,000--May 
1, 1989; $10,000--May 1, 1990; $10,000 May 1, 1991; and $7,717.96--May 1, 1992). 
3See Note 1 Supra. 
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Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 857 P.2d at 942. In Soter's, the 
Utah Supreme Court held the intent to relinquish a right must be 
"distinct." Ld. To decide whether an intent to relinquish it is 
distinct, a fact finder need only decide whether the totality of 
the circumstances "warrants the inference of relinquishment." Id. 
at 942 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, there is no doubt that George and LaRue 
knew of their rights under the Escrow Agreement. The only question 
that this Court must answer is whether the totality of the 
circumstances warrants the inference of relinquishment. Here the 
trial court found and the record supports that there were never any 
discussions about how the nonpayment of the yearly installments was 
to be treated. R. at 252 L. 18-19. No testimony or evidence 
suggests when (if ever) the payments were to resume, under what 
term they were to resume or if interest was to continue to accrue. 
What the testimony does show is that George Fisher commanded Max 
and Joyce not to pay under the terms of the Escrow Agreement but to 
reinvest the money into the property. 
The trial court found, however, that this instruction by 
George was not a waiver but instead constituted an oral agreement 
to modify the terms of the Escrow Agreement. As noted above, his 
conclusion is clearly erroneous and contrary to existing law. 
23 
Indeed, there is no precedent for treating a waiver of this type as 
an oral modification. The facts clearly support a finding that 
George and LaRue relinquished their rights under the Escrow 
Agreement and therefore waived their rights to collect such 
payments under the agreement at this late date.4 
4George and LaRue Fishers rights under the Escrow Agreement are as follows: 
in case the Buyers shall fail to make the payments aforesaid, or any of 
them punctually, and upon the strict terms and at the times limited, time 
of payment being of the essence of this agreement, or if they, the Buyers, 
shall breach any other covenant herein contained, then the Sellers, may, 
at their option, declare this agreement terminated and canceled by serving 
upon the Buyers a thirty (3 0) days written notice of their intention so to 
do . . . 
if the Buyers shall fail to make the payments due or fail to comply with 
any other covenants, within the period herein provided for in such notice, 
then all rights and interests of the Buyers shall thereupon terminate 
without further demand or notice . . . [and Buyers! shall become subject 
to the statutory action for unlawful detainer in the event possession of 
said premises and property are not delivered over to Sellers . . . 
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyers, 
or upon failure to make any payments when the same shall become due, or 
within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Sellers shall, at their option, be 
released from all obligations in law and equity to convey said property 
and all payments which have been made theretofore on the contract by the 
Buyers shall be forfeited to the Sellers as liquidated damages for the 
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyers agree that the Sellers 
may, at their option, re-enter and take possession of said premises 
without legal process as in its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements shall remain with the land and become the property of the 
Sellers, the Buyers becoming at once a tenant at will of the Sellers. It 
is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
That time is the essence of this agreement and if the Sellers accept 
payment from the Buyers less than according to the terms herein mentioned, 
then by so doing, it will not, in any way alter the terms of the agreement 
as to the forfeiture herein contained. 
See Addendum A. 
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Looking to the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances here, George and 
LaRue F i s h e r ' s waiver to t h e i r r i g h t s under the contrac t i s 
unequivocable. The t r i a l court found tha t several t imes, George 
Fisher ins t ruc ted Max and Joyce "not to make payments to him but to 
continue to invest the year ly instal lment payments in to 
improvements on the property."5 R. a t 252 L. 9-11. 
5At t r i a l , Max t e s t i f i e d as fo l low: 
Q. . . . Was t h e r e ever any conve r sa t i on between you and your f a t h e r a t t he 
time you s o l d your da i ry herd? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, could you d e s c r i b e f i r s t of a l l when did t h a t occur? 
A. ' 79 . 
Q. And where did this conversation occur? 
A. At my place. 
Q. All right. Let's get back to the 1979 when you were in the corrals with 
your father and your wife. Why don't you go ahead and relate your recollection 
of the conversation. 
A. Well, my father came down to the place and I told him that I had sold the 
milk cow and they were going to go to two individuals--two different individuals. 
Wally Stephensen was the one fellow and Jenkins--Howard Jenkin's family was the 
family was the other. 
I said, "Father, I want you to -- your going to have to take part of this 
money." Or take this money. I wanted him to take it all but he says, "I don't 
want none of it. I can't use it." 
Q. Okay. Wait just a moment. You say you wanted him to take it all? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you mean by all? 
A. I wanted him to take both sales. They was two different--they was going 
to be two different--there was actually two different sales and I wanted him to 
take both sales of those cattle. 
Q. And what was the dollar value of each of those sales, do you recall? 
A. It's right there on the paper. The one of them was right at $25,000 and 
the other one was $56, 58. How much is it? It was $58,000. 
Q. And so you say you offered your father the two sales, $58,000 and $25,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did your father say? 
A. He says, "I don't want them. I can't use that money." He says, "I can't 
use that money." 
Q. Excuse me, Max. Did he make--did he explain why he couldn't use the money? 
A. He said it would just go to taxes. I didn't know his income. He said it 
would just go to taxes. 
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Q. So--
A. And I replied that you're going to have to take one. So he agreed to take 
the one draft. 
Q. And--
A. And it was the smaller. He says, "I want the--if you're insisting, I'll 
take the smaller draft." And that was the Wally Stephensen draft. 
A. This document [D-7] represent the draft that my father received from those 
cattle. 
Q. Okay. And does that help you determine what the amount that actually went 
to your father as the sale of your cattle? 
A. To the penny, $24,980. 
Q. Did your father ever acknowledge to you that he had received the money. 
A. Yes. 
(R. 401-403) 
The trial court found this testimony credible and did apply the $24,980 draft 
from the sale of these cattle to the contract price. 
Max further testified that in 1988 he and his father, mother and wife were 
discussing the need for a new home on property because of structural damage to 
the old one. Max proposed to buy a house off of the ranch and to that his father 
replied: 
A. . . . "you know that you can't do that." He says, "you can't live off of 
one of these ranches and run it." He says, "It's a deterrent to you." He says, 
"If you're going to run a place, you've got to live on it." 
Q. Okay. And what was your response? 
A. I says, "Well, what happens when enforce (sic) me to make these payments? 
I can't do it." 
A. And he say, "Don't worry about it." He says, "I'm getting this taken care 
of as quickly as I can to make it equal with you kids." . . . He says, "you'd 
better build a home." 
Q. Okay. Did your father did your father ask for payments. 
A. No. 
Q. Max, was there anything else that your father said about your concern for 
the payments other than don't build the home-- or go ahead and build the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said to the effect, "I wish you kids would try to appreciate what we're 
doing for you than--I guess he thought we was acting kind of bitter towards him 
or something, but he made the statement--my father made that statement that day. 
He says,--and he turned to I and the wife and says, "I wish you would show us a 
little more appreciation to what we're doing--trying to do for you." 
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In re l iance upon these conversations, Max and Joyce invested 
t h e i r money by improving the property r a the r than making t h e i r 
annual payments. The t r i a l court found tha t the "improvements to 
the land tha t were made as a r e s u l t of not making payments are 
subs tan t i a l and have resu l t ed in a subs t an t i a l increase in the 
value of the land." R. at 252 L. 5-6. At one point in i t s 
decis ion, the t r i a l court ap t ly s ta ted tha t i t seems "extremely 
unjust to the Court to allow George to i n s t r u c t the Buyers not to 
make payments and then allow a fo r fe i tu re based upon the re l i ance 
of the Buyers in not making payments." R. a t 252 L.21-23. 
No annual payments, beginning with the o r ig ina l payment due on 
May 1, 1975 and ending in 1992 with the f ina l payment, were ever 
Q. Okay. Was t he re anything e l s e s a i d t h a t you h a v e n ' t p r ev ious ly r e l a t e d or 
expla ined? . . . I would l i k e t o know how your f a t h e r responded? . . . 
A. My father--my fa the r t o l d me t h a t I was to go ahead and bu i ld the home--the 
new home. That he was going t o have the r e s t of t h i s - - t r y t o ge t t he r e s t of 
these a f f a i r s taken care of. That he wouldn ' t need t h e s e - - I wouldn ' t be pressed 
t o make these payments. 
Q. Did he a c t u a l l y say you would not be p ressed t o make the payments? 
A. No. He d i d n ' t a c t u a l l y say t h a t I wouldn ' t be p r e s s e d t o do i t , but he 
s a y s , "Don't worry about i t . " He s a y s , " Don' t worry about i t . " He says , "go 
ahead and b u i l d the new home." 
Q. Max, as a r e s u l t of t h a t conve r sa t ion t h a t you had wi th your f a t h e r - - d i d 
your mother say anyth ing , by t he way a t t h a t time? 
A. I d o n ' t r e c a l l her ever say ing . 
(R. 412-419) 
Based upon these conversations, Max destroyed the old home and took out a loan 
to build a new home on the property. The trial court found this testimony 
entirely credible and made findings of fact accordingly. 
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made due to George Fisher's instructions to Max and Joyce. Neither 
George nor LaRue took any action to enforce their rights under the 
Escrow Agreement for over 19 years even though the Escrow Agreement 
stated that "time was of the essence" for payment. Finally, it was 
not until after George's death that LaRue chose to take action. 
These facts unequivocally demonstrate that George never 
intended that he and LaRue legally enforce the terms of the Escrow 
Agreement. George waived these rights for both him and his wife 
for over 19 years and his wife consented by her inaction to that 
waiver. Now, Max and Joyce will be irreparably harmed if LaRue 
disavows the actions made by her and her husband for the last 19 
years. Accordingly, this Court should declare that George and 
LaRue waived their legal rights under the Escrow Agreement and deny 
Plaintiffs' requested relief. 
B. Estoppel 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel is a long recognized 
defense in the State of Utah and should be invoked by the trial 
court where a party's actions induce a detrimental course of action 
by another. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P. 2d 
688, 691 (Utah 1985) . In order to successful estop a party from 
enforcing a right, the opposing party must prove three things: 
First, he must show a statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
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by one par ty inconsis tent with a l a t e r asser ted claim. Secondly, 
he must show the other p a r t y ' s reasonable action or inact ion based 
on the f i r s t p a r t y ' s statement, admission, act or f a i lu re to a c t . 
And f i n a l l y , injury to the second par ty tha t would r e s u l t from 
allowing the f i r s t party to contradic t or repudiate i t s statement, 
admission, act or f a i lu re to a c t . Cesco v. Concrete S p e c i a l i s t , 
I n c . . 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989). 
George's continued refusal to f i r s t of a l l accept payments 
when tendered6, and subsequent inac t ion as other payments became 
due, coupled with the fact tha t George was v i s i t i n g Max and the 
farm cont inual ly up u n t i l the time of h is death, and LaRue' s 
absolute inact ion for 19 years a l l cons t i t u t e in t en t iona l ac t s 
which are inconsis tent with the asse r t ed claims of the Notice and 
the claims se t forth in p l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint. 
Based upon such representa t ions , Max continued to l ive on the 
farm and improve i t with the monies his father to ld him to re inves t 
in to the proper ty . Such act ion by Max and Joyce was e n t i r e l y 
6As d i s cus sed p rev ious ly , Max and LaRue tendered $82,000 payment i n 
1989. At t h a t time George t o l d Max t h a t he d id not want ti:•... money because of t a x 
consequences and ordered Max t o r e i n v e s t t h e money i n t o the p r o p e r t y . See 
footnote 5 supra for Max's test imony on t h i s s u b j e c t . The t r i a l cour t found t h i s 
tes t imony c r e d i b l e and ordered t h a t approximately $24,000 of the debt be s e t off 
a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l deb t . 
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reasonable in light of George and LaRue's past statements and 
behavior. 
To allow a forfeiture of defendants' interest in the ranch 
would be a terrible injustice and cause defendants substantial 
injury because they were not able to satisfy a demand to pay an 
unknown sum of money within 3 0 days of being served with a Notice 
of Termination of Agreement. Twenty years of work and improvements 
to the Ranch will be lost, not to mention a newly constructed home 
and other improvements to the property if this equitable doctrine 
were overlooked by this Court. 
C. Laches 
"The doctrine of laches may be defined generally as a rule of 
equity by which equitable relief is denied to one who has been 
guilty of unconscionable delay, as shown by surrounding facts and 
circumstances, in seeking that relief." 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity, § 
152. Utah courts have long recognized the doctrine of laches as an 
equitable defense, appropriate where there is a lack of diligence 
by the claimant, and resulting injury to defendants. Plateau 
Mining v. Utah Division of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 
1990) . The equitable doctrine of laches applies whether or not 
there are applicable statutes of limitation, and despite whether 
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those statutes are satisfied. American Tierra v. City of West 
Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992). 
Plaintiffs demand for payment was not timely made. Paragraph 
(d) of Provision V found on page 3 of the Escrow Agreement states 
"that time is of the essence of this agreement. . . . " Yet 
Plaintiffs failed to act accordingly. "Ordinarily, a reasonable 
time is implied where the contract does not specify the time within 
which a demand should be made." 17 C.J.S. at 678 
A demand for payment on a contract that is 19 years old and 
the final payment date having past is certainly not made within a 
reasonable time, especially given the fact that it came after 
George, who was the party who had previously dealt with Max, had 
past away. 
It has been held that the time limited for bringing an action 
on the contract should be treated as the time within which the 
demand would be made where there is nothing to indicate an 
expectation that demand is to be made quickly or that there is 
to be a delay in making it, and that, in the absence of a 
stipulated time within which the contract must be fulfilled, 
the demand may be made within the time limited by the statute 
for maintenance of an action for breach of the contract of for 
termination thereof. Id. 
In Utah, the legislature has decreed that six years is ample 
time in which to commence an action enforcing the terms of an 
agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2). Indeed, 19 years is over 
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twice as long as the longest statutes of limitations in Utah, 
clearly unconscionable delay. 
Besides this unconscionable delay, Max and Joyce will suffer 
irreparable harm due to Plaintiffs' inaction. To allow plaintiffs 
to prevail on their claim of forfeiture would be a great inequity 
to Max and Joyce who have continued to live on the land, work and 
improve it and even with the advice, knowledge and consent of 
plaintiffs, went ahead and built a new home on it. The doctrine of 
laches is ideally suited to this case. Plaintiffs completely 
failed to act on any past due payments. George reassured Max on 
several occasions that payment was not necessary and based upon 
such assurances, Max and Joyce did not take the necessary action to 
protect their legal rights in the property. The law does not 
require such forceful action. The equitable doctrine of laches 
prevents this harsh result and should be applied in this case. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FORFEITURE WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND 
THIS FINDING SHOULD BE UPHELD BOTH BECAUSE IT IS WELL GROUNDED IN TESTIMONY 
AND EVIDENCE AND AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Utah courts have long held that forfeiture is a harsh penalty 
and such contract provisions will be strictly construed against 
the one who seeks to enforce them. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n. v. 
Ultrasystems W. Construction Co., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah App. 
1988). However, parties are usually free to contract to whatever 
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terms they can agree upon. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 
P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1976). 
A. Notice 
It has been well established in Utah that in order for a court 
to order forfeiture the seller must strictly abide by the 
procedures set forth in the written contract.7 First Security Bank 
v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1983). Under the terms of 
7The Escrow Agreement provides that: 
In the event the Sellers desire to terminate this agreement in accordance 
with the forfeiture provisions contained herein, the Sellers shall deliver 
to the escrow holder a written notice stating the payments which are 
delinquent and the covenants with which the Buyers have failed to comply 
and that this agreement will be terminated by them, the Sellers, unless 
said delinquent payments are paid or the covenants complied with by the 
Buyers within thirty (30) days from the date such notice is delivered to 
the escrow holder. At its option the escrow holder may mail a copy of 
said notice by registered mail to the Buyers. If such delinquent payments 
are not paid and such conditions complied with by the Buyers within such 
period of thirty (3 0) days, the escrow holder shall thereafter immediately 
deliver such documents as are held by the escrow agent to the Sellers; 
provided, however, that if the Buyers before the expiration of said period 
of thirty (30) days, deliver to the escrow holder written notice that they 
object to the termination of the agreement and to the escrow holder 
delivering said documents to the Sellers for any reason, the escrow holder 
shall then at its convenience, deliver to the Sellers a copy of such 
notice, or at its option mail a copy of such notice by registered mail to 
the Sellers, and thereafter the escrow holder shall withhold delivery of 
said documents until such time as both the Buyers and Sellers shall direct 
it in writing what disposition to make thereof, and if no directions are 
so received by the escrow holder, it may withhold delivery until its 
duties and the rights of the parties with respect thereto, have been 
judicially determined. However, if the Buyers serve no written objection 
to the delivery of said documents by the escrow holder to the sellers 
within the said period of thirty (30) days, the escrow holder shall 
immediately deliver such documents to the Sellers without further 
liability, duty, or obligation therefor or in connection therewith, to the 
Buyers. 
See Addendum A. 
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the Escrow Agreement in this case, Plaintiffs are required to 
notify the escrow agent of the exact breach and also to notify the 
Max and Joyce that they are intending to terminate the agreement. 
Throughout the course of these proceedings, absolutely no evidence 
was presented that Plaintiffs ever attempted to notify the escrow 
holder of the exact breach. Under the strict compliance rules for 
forfeiture, Plaintiffs have failed to either allege or prove their 
compliance with the explicit terms of the Escrow Agreement 
therefore, forfeiture cannot be granted. 
Furthermore, in the present case, the trial court found that 
Max and Joyce had not been making the annual payments due to the 
request of their father. The court indicated that at the time the 
Notice of Termination of Agreement was sent to Max and Joyce, they 
had been acting in reliance upon George's representations and that 
no payment was due until the following May 1, payment date. 
Therefore, the notice was prior to any actual default and thus 
defective. 
The notice was also defective because it failed to specify the 
amount that Plaintiffs believed would be necessary to remedy the 
breach. In First Security Bank, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
if there is any ambiguity or lack of clarity in the notice, that it 
would be deemed to be defective and forfeiture would not be 
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granted. Indeed, the Court specifically stated, "we think 
forfeiture should be refused when the notice was given to the 
delinquent buyers is indefinite or uncertain as to the amount he is 
to pay or the performance demanded of him." 659 P.2d at 1080, 
(citations omitted.) 
Careful review of Plaintiffs' Notice of Termination of 
Agreement reveals that Max and Joyce were never notified what 
amount Plaintiffs' considered necessary to cure the alleged breach. 
Therefore, once again forfeiture should be denied. 
B. Conscienability of Forfeiture Enforcement 
Not only should this forfeiture clause not be enforced because 
of the defective notice, but Utah law has consistently held that a 
contract should be enforced according to its terms, unless that 
result is so unconscionable that a court of equity will refuse to 
enforce it. Bellon. 808 P.2d at 1096. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that it will enforce a forfeiture clause, unless they "find 
that the forfeiture would be so grossly excessive relation to any 
realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the 
parties that it would so shock the conscience." Id. An 
examination of Utah case law shows that this court will enforce the 
forfeiture clause when the amount of forfeiture does not greatly 
exceed, or is less than, the amount of damages. Id. 
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Infact, the Utah Supreme Court, when addressing the forfeiture 
clause of a contract for real property stated: 
It will be observed that in all cases where the stipulation 
for liquidated damages was enforced it bore some reasonable 
relation to the actual damages which could reasonably be 
anticipated at the time the contract was made and was not a 
forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant 
recovery. 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1952). 
The forfeiture clause in this contract is a stipulation for 
liquidated damages as discussed in Perkins. Here, the trial court 
properly found that 
As previously indicated, based upon the statement of George 
that payments would not be expected, a home was built upon the 
property which is free of any encumbrance to the land. Other 
buildings were built, sprinkling systems were installed, the 
land was cleared and graded, ponds were constructed and 
expanded, and the property was improved. The Court finds that 
the property has been substantially improved as a direct 
result of the monies which would have otherwise been made 
toward the contracts being invested in the property. The 
defendants relied upon the fact that payments would not be 
required until they were requested in their decision to invest 
payment monies into improvements. The parties had agreed to 
defer payments, Therefore, the defendants were not in default 
under the terms of the contract as modified when notice was 
sent in March of 1993. Under these circumstances, even if the 
contract was breached, it would be inequitable for the Sellers 
to allow and encourage payments to be invested in the property 
and then use the failure to pay as a basis for breach of 
contract. R. at 257 L. 12-14. (emphasis added).8 This 
8The Escrow Agreement provides that: 
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms [of the Escrow 
Agreement] . . . Sellers may, at their option, re-enter and take 
36 
finding of fact remains unchallenged. P l a in t i f f s have fa i led 
to provide any fac ts tha t would dispute the courts finding 
that i t would be inequitable to order fo r fe i tu re . Therefore, 
t h i s Court must uphold the t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision and refuse 
to order f o r f e i t u r e . 
C. Pla int i f f s Have Failed to Marshall the Evidence to Demonstrate 
How Trial Court's Finding that Forfeiture i s Inequitable i s 
Clearly in Error 
P l a i n t i f f s ' br ief focuses e n t i r e l y upon the equ i t i es involved 
in t h e i r requested fo r f e i t u r e . At no time did they attempt to 
marshall the evidence necessary to overturn a t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
equi table f inding. The Utah Supreme Court has held tha t a t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f inding tha t i t would be inequi tab le to fo r f e i t r e a l 
property under a contract must be afforded the same standard of 
review as a c o u r t ' s factual finding. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d at 
1096; Bountiful v. Riley 784 P.2d at 1175; Ashton v. Ashton, 793 
p o s s e s s i o n of s a i d premises wi thout l e g a l p rocess as in i t s f i r s t and 
former e s t a t e , t o g e t h e r w i l l a l l improvements and a d d i t i o n s made by t h e 
Buyers thereon , and sa id add i t ions and improvements s h a l l remain wi th t h e 
land and become the p r o p e r t y of S e l l e r s , t he Buyers becoming a t once a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l of the S e l l e r s . The evidence a l s o suppor t s t h i s 
conc lus ion . 
Therefore, under t h i s con t r ac t c lause , P l a i n t i f f s would recover the p rope r ty with 
the s u b s t a n t i a l improvements and subsequent i n c r e a s e in p r o p e r t y va lue wi thout 
any encumbrance on the p r o p e r t i e s t i t l e . At t h e same t ime, Defendants would 
s t i l l be l i a b l e for the loans they took out t o improve the p r o p e r t y . Thus 
P l a i n t i f f s would in e f f ec t recover both the p r o p e r t y and a l l monies due under the 
Escrow Agreement. 
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P.2d at 150 n.l. Therefore, a finding of this nature will only be 
overturned if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Plaintiffs have failed 
to provide any attempt to marshall the evidence to show that the 
trial court reached this finding in clear error. Under this rule 
of appellate scrutiny, this court should assume that the trial 
court's finding was correct and refuse to address the issue. 
V. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR 
ON THE FACTUAL ISSUES THEY WISH TO APPEAL 
A trial court's factual finding will only be overturned if it 
is clear error. Bountiful, 784 P.2d at 1175. Therefore, the party 
seeking to have the finding overturned has the burden of 
marshalling all the evidence to show that there is no foundation 
for the trial court's finding. Slattery. 857 P. 2d at 249. If 
appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, appellate courts 
must assume the findings are correct. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 
846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with appropriate 
citation to the record, the appellant must then demonstrate that 
the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most 
favorable to the decision. Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P. 2d 
134, 138 (Utah 1992); McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 
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App. 1992). If the appellant fails to do so, the disputed issue 
should be disregarded. Id. 
A. LaRue Fisher is bound by the actions of her husband. 
The trial court found that based upon the testimony off all 
parties, LaRue allowed her husband to be spokesman for them in 
their dealings with Max. The court specifically found: 
[LaRue] knew that others viewed George as their spokesman when 
it came to business matters. And she allowed this to occur 
even when she was in disagreement as to the decision which had 
been reached. It is very apparent that George didn't want 
trouble between he and his son, and LaRue didn't want trouble 
between her and her husband. So she didn't take any action 
and neither did they. Under these circumstances, the Court 
believes that LaRue is also bound by the representations of 
George with respect to the payments. The Court also believes 
that LaRue knew that George had authorized some kind of delay 
in the payments. 
R. at 255 L. 7-12. The testimony supports this finding. Although 
many people testified that they knew LaRue was not happy about the 
arrangement between her husband and Max, no one (except LaRue) 
could testify that she had ever asked Max for the payments until 
after her husband's death. Infact, the trial court chose to 
discredit LaRue's testimony and found that "the Court relies upon 
the testimony of Max that his mother first asked for payment about 
a year after his father died. R. at 254 L. 1-2. See also R. 522 
L. 12-25. 
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In a thorough examination of the record, the trial court's 
finding on this issue is well grounded in testimony and evidence. 
There is no showing that the facts relied upon by the trial court 
are legally insufficient to support such a finding. As a result, 
this court should disregard this portion of plaintiffs' argument 
and uphold the trial court's finding that LaRue Fisher's actions 
have bound her to the decisions made by her husband. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to not only have the trial 
court's finding that LaRue Fisher was bound by the actions of 
George Fisher, Jr. overturned but also Plaintiffs are arguing that 
the trial court erred when it found that LaRue first asked for 
payments about a year after George's death. R. at 254 L. 1-2. At 
no point do plaintiffs attempt to marshall the evidence to show 
this finding was in error. Furthermore, they do not, and cannot, 
show how the evidence supporting this finding was legally 
insufficient. Therefore this issue should also be disregarded and 
the trial court's finding upheld. 
B. The proceeds from the Cattle sale in 1979 were properly 
credited to an Escrow payment 
The trial court found that: 
Max and Joyce have each testified that the 26 head of cattle 
were their cattle. . . . As between the two parties [Max and 
Joyce's testimony versus LaRue's], the recollection of LaRue 
is not as good as Max's. LaRue simply was not involved in the 
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daily operation of the dairy and did not have a clear 
recollection concerning these issues. Based upon all the 
evidence, the court finds that the cattle which were sold in 
1979 were owned by Max and Joyce, therefore, the amount due 
under the contract should be reduced by the amount of $24,980. 
R. at 258 L. 2-4. Furthermore, this finding is supported through 
the testimony of Max Fisher. See Footnote 3 Supra. Plaintiffs 
have first of all failed to marshall all the evidence, and 
secondly, demonstrate how the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support a finding that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in 
making this finding. Therefore, this finding of the trial court 
should be sustained. 
VI. IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MODIFIED , THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
CONCLUDING THAT INTEREST CONTINUED TO ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT PRINCIPLE WHEN 
ALL THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT CONTINUED ACCRUAL WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED BY 
THE PARTIES, GEORGE FISHER DID NOT EXPECT INTEREST TO ACCRUE AND THE 
PAYMENTS WERE WAIVED BY BOTH GEORGE AND LARUE FISHER. 
In its decision, the trial court found that "the purchasers 
owe the entire sum under the contract plus interest less the down 
payment and the amount received for cattle ($24,980)." This 
finding not only goes against the entirety of the evidence, but it 
is legally incorrect. 
A. No Evidence Supports Trial Court's Factual Finding That the 
Parties Agreed To Pay Interest. 
As stated in the statement of facts in this brief, the only 
testimony regarding whether interest would continue to accrue on 
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any payments that were not waived by George, was the testimony of 
James J. Oman. Mr. Oman testified that in a conversation between 
himself, George and LaRue he heard George state on two occasions 
that "'I don't think we should charge interest on [the payments].'" 
R. at 526 L. 17. Cross-Appellants have been unable to find any 
other testimony or evidence presented to the trial court on this 
issue. 
As a matter of law, this evidence is totally insufficient to 
substantiate the trial court's finding that the parties agreed on 
continued accrual of interest. Therefore, this finding should be 
overturned. 
B. George Fisher Waived Continued Accrual of Interest 
Not only is this finding clearly erroneous but its result is 
totally inequitable as George Fisher waived his rights to collect 
interest under the Escrow Agreement. As discussed in point III of 
this brief, waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. To determine whether a party intentionally relinquished a 
right, the court should look to the totality of the circumstances. 
In this case, George Fisher's only expressed desire on the issue of 
waiver was his assertion that he did not believe that he and his 
wife should waive the collection of interest. R. 526 L. 17. 
Although there was testimony that LaRue did not agree on this 
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issue, the trial court found that her inaction and acquiescence to 
her husbands desires in issues of business bound her to his 
actions. R. 255 L. 7-12. Under these circumstances, and the 
other circumstances discussed in this brief, it would be 
inequitable for this court to order accrued interest on the Escrow 
Agreement. In effect, if would allow a party to refuse to accept 
payment for 19 years so they could collect the accrued interest 
from the account. This result is ludicrous and should be avoided. 
Plaintiffs should not be granted accrued interest. 
VI. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS ACTION. 
As discussed throughout this brief, Max and Joyce Fisher have 
relied upon the representations of their father that they need not 
make the payments under the Escrow Agreement. Based upon these 
representations, they took actions which, if this Court grants 
Plaintiff's requested relief, will result in great detriment to 
them. Max and Joyce have incurred great expenses in the defense of 
this action. Should Defendants prevail on the issues presented in 
this brief, they should be granted attorneys fees in compliance 
with the Escrow Agreement.9 
9The Escrow Agreement provides that a party prevailing on any action 




The trial court's ruling that this contract for the sale of 
real property was in error. First, this ruling is contrary to the 
Statue of Frauds. And secondly, all the parties failed to come to 
a meeting of the minds about essential terms of the oral 
modification. Absent the finding of an oral modification, 
Plaintiffs are only entitled to the protections granted to them by 
law and under the Escrow Agreement. Based upon their failure to 
pursue this action for over 19 years, they are barred by the 
statute of limitation and the equitable doctrines of waiver, 
estoppel and laches. Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to marshall 
all the evidence to demonstrate that the trial court's factual 
finding that LaRue Fisher is bound by the actions of her husband, 
and that the monies from the sale of cattle in 1979 were accepted 
as payment on the property, was clearly in error. Finally, 
Plaintiffs requested forfeiture should not be granted due to 
Plaintiffs' failure to follow the procedures provided for such 
proceedings in the Escrow Agreement and the extreme inequities that 
would result from such forfeiture. Therefore, this Court should 
deny Plaintiffs requested relief and grant Defendant quieted title 
in the subject property. 
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Respectfully submitted zhijs *r , 1995. 
V\AA&^ 
\Lohta L. Midler 
Attorney for Defendants 
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THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 1st day of May, 1974, 
by and between GEORGE FISHER, JR. , ana LaRUE FISHER, of Altonah, Duchesne 
County, State of Utah, hereinafter called the Sellers, Parties of the First Part, 
and MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE FISHER, of Altonah, Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, hereinafter called the Buyers, Parties of the Second Part. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That the Sellers, in consideration of the money paid and to be paid, 
and the promises and covenants herein expressed to be performed by the 
Buyers, hereby agree to sell and convey to the Buyers for the price and upon 
the terms and conditions herein stipulated; and the Buyers hereby promise and 
agree to purchase for saia price and upon said terms and conditions herein 
specified, those certain tracts of land with the improvements thereon and 
appurtenances thereto. All of said property being situated m Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, and being more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
SE 1/4; Section 6, Township 1 South, Range 3 
West, U . S . M . 
S 1/2 SW 1/4; Section 6, Township 1 South, Range 
3 West, U . S . M . 
N 1/2 NE 1/4, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, NW 1/4; Section 7, 
Township 1 South, Range 3 West, U . S . M . 
SW 1/4 NE 1/4; NW 1/4 NE 1/4; Section 12, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 West, U .S .M. 
Together with all improvements, appurtenances and 
water rights, which include a filing on a spring m 
the office of the Utah State Engineer and 228 shares 
of stock m the Dry Gulch Irrigation Company, Classes 
A and B, thereunto belonging. 
Excepting and reserving therefrom all oil, gas and 
other minerals . 
Grantors reserve the fishing rights m the two lower ponds 
on said property during the term of this agreement. 
The Buyers covenant and agree that they will pay to the Sellers for 
the said property hereunaer sold the total sum of One Hundred Twenty-Four 
Thousand Dollars ($124,000.00), to be paid as follows, to-wit: Eight Thousand 
Two Hundred Eighty Dollars ($8,280.00) at the time of the signing of trus 
agreement, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the unpaia balance 
of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Dollars ($115,720.00) 
to be paid Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) on the 1st day of May, 1975 and 
a like and equal sum on the 1st day of each May thereafter until the full 
balance of the purchase price has been paid m full. Said payments, which 
include interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum, will be applied 
first to interest and then to principal. 
The parties hereto do hereby further covenant ari agree to tne 
following provisions of this contract. 
« i -
PROVISION I 
At the opt ion of the Buyers , any par t , or a l l , of the in s t a l lmen t s 
he re inabove provided to be s a i d , may be a c c e l e r a t e d or paid in advance at any 
t i m e . 
PROVISION II 
It is further agreed be tween the Se l le rs and the Buyers, tha t the 
Se l le rs sha l l pay a l l t a x e s due and payab le for a l l years prior to January 1, 
1974 and after sa id da te Buyers sha l l be r e s p o n s i b l e for payment of sa id t a x e s , 
and to pay a l l other t axes and a s s e s s m e n t s of every kind and nature a s s e s s e d 
s u b s e q u e n t to January 1, 1974, during the life of th i s con t r ac t . 
PROVISION HI 
That upon the execu t ion of th i s con t rac t the Sel lers covenant and 
ag ree to make and execu te a warranty d e e d , conveying a good and marke tab le 
t i t l e to the above d e s c r i b e d l a n d . Said deed a n d / o r other ins t ruments of 
c o n v e y a n c e , toge ther with ev idence of t i t l e covering the rea l property desc r ibed 
above or a t the opt ion of Se l le r s a pol icy of t i t l e insurance to be de l ivered to 
and held by the escrow holder to be he rembe low named . 
PROVISION IV 
It is further agreed by the Buyers , tha t they will at a l l t imes k e e p 
the improvements on sa id property insured a g a i n s t fire in a reputab le in su rance 
company for an amount to a t l e a s t Twenty Thousand Dol lars ( $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . The 
escrow holder s h a l l not be the judge a s to the suff ic iency of any insurance held 
under the terms of t h i s con t r ac t , but a l l p o l i c i e s of insurance sha l l be de l ivered 
to and be held by the escrow holder during the term of sa id e s c r o w . 
PROVISION V 
It is mutual ly unders tood and agreed tha t the First Securi ty Bank 
of Utah , at i t s Rooseve l t , U tah , office s h a l l a c t a s escrow holder of a l l documents 
appur tenan t to or used m connec t ion with t h i s agreement unt i l a l l amounts due 
hereunder are paid in full upon the following terms and cond i t ions , t o - w i t 
(a) Upon the execu t ion hereof, the or iginal of t m s agreement 
toge ther with warranty d e e d , and water ce r t i f i ca t e s sha l l be del ivered to sa id 
Fi rs t Secur i ty Bank of Utah , N .A . , escrow ho lder , to be held m escrow and 
de l ive red to the Buyers upon the payment of a l l amounts aue hereunder , or in 
the event of defau l t , re turned to the Se l l e r s m acco rdance with the provis ions 
here inaf ter c o n t a i n e d . 
(b) The Se l l e r s and Buyers sna i l each pay one-ha l f of the escrow 
fee charged by the escrow ho lde r . 
(c) The Sel le rs sha l l de l iver immediate p o s s e s s i o n of s a i c property 
sold hereunder to the Buyers and Buyers s h a l l be en t i t led to keep p o s s e s s i o n 
of the above desc r ibed property only so long as they keep and perform the 
covenan t s and condi t ions here in con ta ined on the i r part to be kep t and 
performed. In c a s e the Buyers sha l l fail to make the payments a foresa id , 
or any of them punc tua l ly , and upon the s t r i c t terms ana at the t imes l imi ted , 
t ime of payment being of tne e s s e n c e of t h i s ag reement , or if t hey , the 
Buyers , sha l l b reach any other covenant he re in con ta ined , then the S e l l e r s , 
may, at the i r op t ion , dec l a re t h i s agreement terminated and cance led by serving 
upon the Buyers a thir ty (30) days wri t ten no t ice of their intent ion so to do , and 
Provided, tha t if the Buyers sha l l fail to make the payments due or 
fai l to comply with any other c o v e n a n t s , wi thin t he period here in provided 
for in such n o t i c e , then a l l r ights and i n t e r e s t s of the Buyers sha l l thereupon 
t e rmina te wi thout further demand or n o t i c e , it being unders tood and agreed 
t h a t the serv ing of such no t ice be comple te upon the da t e of depos i t i ng 
the same by r eg i s t e red mai l , with p o s t a g e prepa id , in any United S ta tes 
Pos t Office wi th in the S ta te of Utah , and a d d r e s s e d to Buyers at the a d d r e s s 
t hey file with the escrow holder , and upon the te rminat ion of th i s con t r ac t , 
a s here in provided, and sub jec t to a l l s t a tu to ry p e n a l t i e s and procedure therefor , 
and par t i cu la r ly sha l l become sub jec t to the s t a tu to ry ac t ion for unlawful 
de t a ine r in the even t p o s s e s s i o n of sa id p remises and property are not de l ivered 
over to the S e l l e r s , or the i r s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t , upon d e m a n d . 
In the even t of a fai lure to comply with the terms hereof by the 
Buyers , or upon fai lure to make any payments when the same sha l l become 
d u e , or wi thin th i r ty (30) days the rea f t e r , the Sel le rs s h a l l , a t the i r opt ion , be 
r e l e a s e d from a l l ob l iga t ions in law and equity to convey sa id property and a l l 
payments which have been made theretofore on the con t rac t by the Buyers , 
s h a l l be forfeited to the Se l le rs a s l iqu ida ted damages for the no n - perform a nee 
of the con t r ac t , and the Buyers agree tha t the Se l l e r s may, at thei r opt ion , 
r e - e n t e r and t ake p o s s e s s i o n of sa id p remises without l ega l p r o c e s s a s in 
i t s f i rs t and former e s t a t e , toge ther with a l l improvements a Ad addi t ions made 
by the Buyers t he r eon , and the sa id add i t ions and improvements sha l l remain 
with the land and become the property of the S e l l e r s , t he Buyers becoming at 
once a t enan t at wil l of the S e l l e r s . It is agreed tha t t ime is the e s s e n c e of 
th i s ag reemen t . 
In the event the re a re any l i e n s or encumbrances aga in s t sa id 
p remises other than t h o s e here in provided for or referred t o , or in the event 
any l i ens or encumbrances other than here in provided for sha l l hereaf ter 
acc rue a g a i n s t the same by a c t s or neg l ec t of the S e l l e r s , t hen the Buyers may 
a t the i r opt ion , pay and d i s c h a r g e the same and r ece ive credi t on the amount 
then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments 
and tnereaf ter the payments here in provided to be m a d e , may at the option of 
Buyers , be su spended unt i l such a t ime a s such s u s p e n d e d payments sha l l 
equa l any sums advanced as a f o r e s a i d . 
It i s he re in mutual ly unders tood and agreed by and be tween the 
pa r t i e s h e r e t o , tha t if e i ther party sha l l fai l or neg lec t to perform any of 
the covenan t s and s t i pu l a t i ons here in con ta ined to be performed on his par t , 
and if any su i t or ac t ion is brought to enforce any of the covenan t s herein 
con ta ined , the defaul t ing party sha l l pay a l l c o s t s and expense s of such ac t i on , 
including a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e . 
(d) That t ime is the e s s e n c e of th i s agreement ana if tne Se l le rs 
a c c e p t payment from the Buyers l e s s than accord ing to the terms here in 
ment ioned , then by so do ing , i t wi l l not , m any way a l t e r the terms of the 
agreement as to the forfeiture here in c o n t a i n e d . 
(e) In t he event the Se l le r s d e s i r e to terrrunate th i s agreement m 
a c c o r d a n c e with the forfeiture provis ions con ta ined he re in , the Sel lers sha l l 
de l iver to the escrow holder a wri t ten no t i ce s t a t ing the payments which are 
de l inquen t and the covenan t s with which the Buyers have fai led to comply and 
tha t t h i s agreement wi l l be termIIB ted by them, the S e l l e r s , u n l e s s sa id 
de l inquen t payments are paid or the covenan t s complied with by the Buyers 
within th i r ty (30) days from the da te such no t ice is de l ive red to the escrow 
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h o l d e r . At i ts opt ion the escrow holder may mail a copy of sa id not ice by 
r e g i s t e r e d mail to the Buyers . If such de l inquen t payments are not paid and 
such condi t ions complied with by the Buyers wi th in such period of thir ty (30) 
d a y s , t he escrow holder sha l l thereaf ter immedia te ly de l ive r such documents 
a s are held by the escrow agent to the Se l l e r s , provided, however , that if the 
Buyers before the expi ra t ion of s a id per iod of th i r ty (30) d a y s , de l iver to the 
escrow holder wri t ten no t ice that they ob jec t to the te rminat ion of the 
agreement and to the escrow holder de l ive r ing sa id documents to the Se l le rs 
for any r e a s o n , the escrow holder sha l l then at i t s c o n v e n i e n c e , de l iver to 
the Se l l e r s a copy of such no t i ce , or a t i t s opt ion mail a copy of such not ice by 
r e g i s t e r e d mail to the S e l l e r s , and thereaf te r t he escrow holder sha l l wi thhold 
de l ive ry of sa id documents unt i l such t ime as both t he Buyers and Se l le rs s h a l l 
d i r ec t i t in wri t ing what d i spos i t i on to make thereof, ana if no d i rec t ions a re 
s o r ece ived by the escrow holder , it may withhold de l ivery unt i l i t s du t ies 
and the r igh ts of the pa r t i e s with r e s p e c t t h e r e t o , have been jud ic ia l ly 
d e t e r m i n e d . However , if the Buyers se rve no wri t ten objec t ion to the de l ivery 
of s a id documents by the escrow holder to the Se l l e r s wi thin the sa id period of 
th i r ty (3 0) d a y s , the escrow holder sha l l immedia te ly de l ive r such documents 
to the Se l l e r s without any further l i ab i l i t y , du ty , or obl iga t ion therefor or in 
connec t ion the rewi th , to the Buyers . The pa r t i e s execu t ing th i s agreement 
s h a l l show thei r r e s p e c t i v e a d d r e s s e s and such a d d r e s s may be used by the 
escrow holder in giving any no t ice required by the terms hereof or for any 
other purpose hereunder unt i l the pa r t i e s g ive sa id escrow holder no t i ce m 
wri t ing of a change of add re s s and thereaf te r s u c h new a d d r e s s s h a l l be used 
by the escrow ho lde r . 
It is mutual ly agreed be tween the pa r t i e s here to tha t the only 
ob l iga t ion imposed upon the escrow agen t i s t o hold the papers m connec t ion 
herewi th and to r ece ive the payments made under the terms of t h i s ag reemen t . 
The s a i d escrow agent sha l l not be l i ab le or ob l iga ted to send any not ice of 
non-paymen t or of forfeiture or of non-compl i ance with the terms of thus 
c o n t r a c t . The escrow agent may, upon demand of the S e l l e r s , m the event of 
defaul t in payment by the Buyers a s he re in con templa ted , and after thir ty (30) 
days after sa id defaul t , re turn the papers to sa id Se l l e r s and cance l th i s 
ag reemen t as it pe r ta ins to sa id escrow a g r e e m e n t . The failure of the par t i es 
he re to to depos i t the proper papers a s here in provided for s h a l l not render to 
escrow holder l i ab le for the s a m e , and the escrow holder is under no obl iga t ion 
to examine or determine the marke tab i l i ty of t i t l e , e f f icacy , g e n u m e s s or va lue 
of any documents here in p laced with the escrow holder to be held by i t . 
(f) That the terms of th i s agreement sha l l be binding upon the h e i r s , 
p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s of the par t i es he re to . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, sa id pa r t i e s have execu ted th is agreement m 
t r i p l i c a t e the day and year first above w r i t t e n . 
Max George Fisher George FiSner'f Jr . 
/Joyce Wisher LaRue Fisher 
BUYERS SELLERS 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
County of D u c h e s n e ) 
On th i s 1st day of May, 1974, pe r sona l ly appeared before me 
GEORGE FISHER, JR , and LaRUE FISHER, S e l l e r s , and MAX GEORGE FISHER 
and JOYCE FISHER, Buyers , the s igners of the above and foregoing Escrow 
Agreement , who duly acknowledged to me tha t they s igned and execu ted the 
s a m e . 
Notary Public j 
Residing a t Rooseve l t , Utah 
My Commiss ion Expires . i^n^u 
ADDENDUM "B 
EXHIBITS 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
VIA REGISTERED MAIL 
TO: Max George Fisher and 
Joyce Fisher 
Box 267 
Altamont, Utah 84001 
Re: Escrow Agreement dated May 1, 1974 by and between George Fisher, 
Jr. and LaRue Fisher as Sellers and Max George Fisher and Joyce 
Fisher as Buyers 
Dear Max George Fisher and Joyce Fisher: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that in accordance with Provision V, paragraph 
(c) of the Escrow Agreement entered into the 1st day of May, 1974 between George Fisher, 
Jr. and LaRue Fisher as Sellers and yourselves as Buyers, the undersigned LaRue Fisher as 
one of the Sellers and Brent Fisher and LaRue Fisher, Trustees of the George Fisher, Jr. 
Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement (hereinafter "Sellers"), intend to terminate 
and cancel the Escrow Agreement because of your failure to make payments due to the 
Sellers in accordance with the Agreement, unless you make all principal payments and 
interest due under the Agreement within mircy (30) days following the deposit of this 
Notice in the United States Registered Mail addressed to you. 
If you fail to make payment to the undersigned of all principal and interest 
due under the Agreement within this thirty (30) day period, then all right and interest of 
you as Buyers shall thereupon terminate without further demand or notice. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that in the event you do not make payment 
of all amounts due under said Escrow Agreement within said thirty (30) day period, you 
will then become subject to the statutory action for unlawful detainer in the event 
possession of said premises and propeity are not delivered over to the Sellers upon 
demand. This is in accordance with the second paragraph contained in Provision V, 
paragraph (c) of said Escrow Agreement. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that in the event you do not make the 
payment due within said thirty (30) days, the Sellers intend to be released from all 
obligations in law and equity to convey said property and all payments which have been 
made theretofore on the contract by you shall be forfeited to the Sellers as liquidated 
damages for the non-performance of the contract. This is in accordance with the third 
paragraph contained in Provision V, paragraph (c) of said Escrow Agreement. 
-2-
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that in the event you fail to make the 
payments due within said thirty (30) days, Sellers intend to take possession of said 
premises without legal process, together with all improvements and additions made by you. 
The additions and improvements remain with the land and will thereby become property 
of the Sellers in accordance with the third paragraph in Provision V, paragraph (c) of the 
Escrow Agreement. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you fail to make the payments due 
within said thirty (30) days, you become at once a tenant at will of Sellers and if it is 
necessary to commence legal action to eject you from the property in accordance with the 
unlawful detainer statutes of the State of Utah, the undersigned will seek an award of all 
costs and expenses of any legal action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, in accordance 
with the last full paragraph in Provision V, paragraph (c) of the Escrow Agreement. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 1993. 
LaRUE FISHER 
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY INTER 
VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST 
By: /'"••", "/ Jk •/;<. •: 
BRENT FISHER, Trustee 
By: 
LaRUE FISHER, Trustee 
cc: Paul J. Barton, Esquire 




1 I MR. KUNZ: YOUR HONOR, AT THE TIME I INDICATED THAT 
2 SINCE IT WASN'T AN ORIGINAL I DIDN'T OBJECT JUST BASED UPON MY 
3 DESIRE TO REVIEW IT. I HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO REVIEW IT, BUT I 
4 DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY PROBLEM THERE AS I'VE LOOKED OVER IT. 
5 1 WAS JUST A BIT— 
6 | THE COURT: WHY DON'T I, SO THAT HE CAN REST, ACCEPT 
7 THAT, SUBJECT TO YOUR—AN ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT IT'S 
8 INDEED A PHOTOGRAPHIC—AND YOU'LL HAVE TO BRING THAT BEFORE 
9 THE COURT. 
10 SUBJECT TO THAT LATITUDE, EXHIBIT NUMBER 1 WILL BE 
11 RECEIVED. 
12 
13 MAX GEORGE FISHER. 
14 CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS 
15 MATTER, AFTER HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND 
1 6 II TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
17 
1 8 II DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. KUNZ: 
20 Q MAX, WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND 
21 PRESENT ADDRESS. 
22 A MAX GEORGE FISHER AND MY ADDRESS IS BOX 267, 
23 ALTAMONT, UTAH, ZIP 84001. 
24 Q AND WHERE DO YOU RESIDE? 
25 A I RESIDE IN THE OLD TOWN THEY CALLED ALTONAH. CLAY 
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1 BASIN. THE HEAD OF CLAY BASIN. 
2 Q NOW, MAX, YOU HAVE HEARD TESTIMONY AS TO THE VARIOUS 
3 EXHIBITS HAVE COME IN REGARDING YOUR AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE 600 
4 ACRES FROM YOUR PARENTS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
5 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
6 Q AND IS THERE ANYTHING DIFFERENT ABOUT THE WAY YOU 
7 WENT ABOUT BUYING THIS HOME FROM YOUR PARENTS THAT WAS 
8 REPRESENTED BY YOUR MOTHER THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN AT 
9 THIS TIME IN REGARD TO WHO DRAFTED THE AGREEMENT OR WHETHER OR 
10 NOT YOU SIGNED IT AND ALL THOSE THINGS. 
11 A THE WAY THAT THE PROPERTY—THE TRANSACTION TOOK 
12 PLACE WAS WITH ME AND MY FATHER AND THE ATTORNEY DILLMAN WAS 
13 THE MAN THAT DRAWED UP THE ESCROW, OR THIS AGREEMENT. AND HE 
14 DID RESIDE IN ROOSEVELT, HAD HIS OFFICE IN ROOSEVELT. AND 
15 THERE WAS NOBODY PRESENT THERE BUT I AND MY FATHER AND THE 
16 ATTORNEY AND THEN THE SECRETARY HE HAD THEN BILLIE. 
17 Q OKAY. BUT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE, DO YOU NOT, MAX, THAT 
18 DOCUMENTS ENTITLED EXHIBIT 1, ESCROW AGREEMENT, THAT'S BEEN 
19 RECEIVED BY THE COURT, IS A REPRESENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT; 
20 IS THAT TRUE? 
21 A I DO. 
22 Q AND ISN'T IT ALSO NOT TRUE THAT THIS AGREEMENT SETS 
23 FORTH AN OBLIGATION THAT YOU AND YOUR WIFE UNDERTOOK WHEREBY 
24 YOU WERE EXPECTED TO PAY THE SUM OF $10,000 ON AN ANNUAL BASIS 
25 1 UNTIL SUCH PURCHASE PRICE, PLUS FIVE PERCENT INTEREST, WAS 
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1 I PAID. 
2 MR. BIRD: WELL, LET'S NOT HAVE YOU LEADING YOUR 
3 WITNESS. YOU OBJECTED TO MY QUESTIONS AND I SUGGEST YOU 
4 OBSERVE THE SAME REQUIREMENT. 
5 THE COURT: TO THE EXTENT THAT'S AN OBJECTION, I'LL 
6 SUSTAIN. 
7 MR. BIRD: I WON'T OBJECT TO THAT ONE, BUT I WILL 
8 THE NEXT ONE. 
9 THE COURT: OKAY. 
10 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) NOW, MAX, DO YOU RECALL WHAT YEAR 
11 THAT TOOK PLACE? 
12 A THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS WRITTEN UP? 
13 Q YES. 
14 A I RECALL IT WAS '75. 
15 Q I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU A COPY OF THE EXHIBIT AND SEE 
16 IF THAT REFRESHES YOUR MEMORY. 
17 A IT SAYS THE FIRST DAY OF MAY, 1974, SO THAT WOULD BE 
18 CORRECT. I'M WRONG. 
19 Q SO WOULD THIS DOCUMENT THEN BE MORE ACCURATE THAN 
20 YOUR MEMORY IN THAT REGARD? 
21 A YES, IT WOULD. 
22 Q MAX, WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING AT THE TIME YOU 
23 ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT AS TO WHEN YOUR FIRST PAYMENT WOULD 
24 | BE DUE? 
25 J MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THAT AS IMMATERIAL AND 
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1 OBJECTIONABLE. THE AGREEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. 
2 MR. KUNZ: WELL, I COULDN'T LEAD HIM WITH THE 
3 1 AGREEMENT SO I WAS ASKING THAT QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. 
4 THE COURT: ARE YOU GETTING AT SOMETHING DIFFERENT? 
5 | MR. KUNZ: NO, NO, I'M NOT. 
6 1 THE COURT: I'M GOING TO OVERRULE THE OBJECTION TO 
7 THE EXTENT OF HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL SPEAK 
8 FOR ITSELF AS TO THE CONTENTS AND THE OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE 
9 PARTIES. HE CAN NOT, HOWEVER, TESTIFY AS TO WHAT HIS 
10 UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT WAS. THAT IS NOT TESTIMONY AS 
11 TO WHAT THE AGREEMENT IN FACT IS. IF YOU UNDERSTAND THE 
12 DISTINCTION I'M MAKING. HE'S NOT TESTIFYING AS TO WHAT THE 
13 AGREEMENT, ONLY WHAT HIS UNDERSTANDING IS. 
14 YOU MAY RESPOND. 
15 THE WITNESS: YOU'LL HAVE TO— 
16 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE 
17 FIRST PAYMENT WAS TO BE PAID ON THE FIRST DAY OF MAY OF 1975. 
18 DID YOU MAKE THAT PAYMENT? 
19 A NO. 
20 Q DID YOU ATTEMPT TO PAY YOUR FATHER THAT PAYMENT? 
21 A IN—YES. 
22 MR. BIRD: WELL, NOW, JUST A MINUTE. I OBJECT TO 
23 THAT QUESTION AS LEADING AND SUGGESTIVE. "DID YOU ATTEMPT TO 
24 PAY" IT? I SAY THAT'S A LEADING AND SUGGESTIVE AND 
25 J ARGUMENTATIVE QUESTION. 
73 
1 THE COURT: OVERRULED. IT DOESN'T SUGGEST WHETHER 
2 1 OR NOT HE DID. 
3 I Q (BY MR. KUNZ) AND WHAT WAS YOUR ANSWER TO THE 
4 || QUESTION, MAX? 
5 A I SAID YES. 
6 J Q OKAY. AND COULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT ATTEMPT? 
7 | A HOW FAR IN DETAIL DO YOU WANT ME TO GO? 
8 Q VERY MUCH. 
9 I A VERY MUCH SO? 
10 I Q YES. 
11 A I WAS IN THE BOTTOM OF MY FIELD— 
12 Q OKAY. FIRST OF ALL, WHEN DID THIS OCCUR? WHEN DID 
13 YOU MAKE THE ATTEMPT TO PAY? 
14 A THAT WOULD'VE BEEN IN THE SUMMER, THE SPRING OF '74. 
15 IT WOULD'VE BEEN ABOUT MAY, APRIL. I DON'T KNOW THE DATES, 
16 BUT IT WAS IN TOWARDS THE SPRING, IT WASN'T INTO THE SUMMER, 
17 BUT IT WAS INTO THE SPRING. 
18 Q OKAY. 
19 MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. I OBJECT TO THE QUESTION 
20 ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF LARUE HANSEN IS NOT SHOWN TO 
21 HAVE BEEN PRESENT. CONVERSATIONS WITH GEORGE FISHER ALONE ARE 
22 NOT ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND BECAUSE OF 
23 HEARSAY. IT'S NOT RELIABLE TESTIMONY AND SHOULD NOT BE 
24 RECEIVED. 
25 J MR. KUNZ: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT A 
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1 QUESTION THAT FALLS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. FIRST OF 
2 ALL, I HAVEN'T EVEN COVERED WITH MAX YET THE FACT WHO WAS 
3 PRESENT AT THE TIME SUCH AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE. AND 
4 FURTHERMORE, HE CERTAINLY DOES HAVE A RIGHT TO TALK ABOUT ANY 
5 CONVERSATIONS THAT HE HAD WITH ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE 
6 CONTRACT. 
7 THE COURT: ARE YOU GOING TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A 
8 DEBT WAS FORGIVEN? 
9 MR. KUNZ: WELL, YES, I AM. 
10 THE COURT: OR WHETHER OR NOT A PAYMENT WAS 
11 FORGIVEN. 
12 OKAY. THE COURT WILL RULE THIS ISSUE—MAYBE YOU 
13 WOULD LIKE TO, MR. BIRD, EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THE STATUTE OF 
14 FRAUD ISSUE IS HERE. 
15 MR. BIRD: YES. THE PARTIES—THERE WERE TWO PARTIES 
16 TO THE AGREEMENT. NOW, THIS CONVERSATION IN M A Y — I DON'T KNOW 
17 WHETHER IT TOOK PLACE IN MAY OF '75 OR AFTER OCTOBER 10TH, 
18 1975 WHEN THE ESCROW AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE, BUT IN EITHER 
19 EVENT THERE WERE TWO PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION, A HUSBAND AND 
20 WIFE. AND THE FIRST CASE WE'VE GIVEN YOU OF ZUNIAN INVOLVED 
21 HUSBAND AND WIFE AND IT HELD THAT THE REPRESENTATION BY THE 
22 HUSBAND DID NOT BIND THE WIFE BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF 
23 FRAUDS. 
>4 THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S THE CONCLUSION, NOT THE 
!5 ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE. IT MAY BE THAT THE CONCLUSION 
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1 REASON, BUT I NEED TO HEAR PRELIMINARILY THE EVIDENCE AND SEE 
2 WHETHER OR NOT IT DOES VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BECAUSE 
3 THERE ARE SOME EXCEPTIONS WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
4 SPECIFICALLY, I THINK THE SECTION THAT YOU REFERRED THE COURT 
5 TO WAS 25-5-5, OR 25-5-1, ESTATE IN THE INTEREST OF PROPERTY, 
6 NO ESTATE OR INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY OTHER THAN LEASES FOR 
7 TERMS NOT EXTENDING ONE YEAR, NOR ANY TRUST OR POWER OR 
8 CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY OR IN ANY MATTER RELATED THERETO 
9 SHALL BE CREATED, GRANTED, ASSIGNED, SURRENDERED—AND THAT WAS 
10 THE WORD THAT YOU WANTED TO DEAL WITH IS "SURRENDER." 
11 MR. BIRD: YES. AND THAT'S THE SECTION THAT— 
12 THE COURT: OR DECLARED OTHERWISE THEN BY AN ACT OR 
13 OPERATION OF LAW. 
14 YOUR ARGUMENT, MR. KUNZ, IS THAT THERE IS NO 
15 SURRENDER OF THE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. THIS IS A 
16 SURRENDER AS RIGHT TO PAYMENTS. 
17 MR. KUNZ: THE PROPERTY WAS SURRENDERED AT THE TIME 
18 THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO. 
19 THE COURT: OKAY. AND I THINK THAT I NEED TO HEAR 
20 IT IN ORDER TO MAKE THAT TYPE OF CONSIDERATION. 
21 SO YOUR RULING ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUD IS DENIED 
22 BECAUSE I NEED TO HEAR MORE TO MAKE A FACTUAL DECISION AS TO 
23 WHAT WAS HAPPENING. 
24 AND ALSO UNDER THE HEARSAY OBJECTION THAT YOU MAKE, 
25 RULE 804, HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS, SAYS "A STATEMENT WHICH WAS AT 
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1 THE TIME OF ITS MAKING—THIS IS WHERE A DECLARANT IS 
2 UNAVAILABLE AND ONE OF THE SPECIFIC AREAS IT DESCRIBES AN 
3 UNAVAILABLE WITNESS AS SOMEONE WHO IS PASSED AWAY OR DECEASED. 
4 AND IT SAYS "STATEMENT WHICH AT THE TIME OF ITS MAKING WAS SO 
5 FAR CONTRARY TO THE DECLARANT'S PECUNIARY OR PROPERTY INTEREST 
6 OR SO FAR TENDED TO SUBJECT DECLARANT TO CIVIL OR CRIMINAL 
7 LIABILITY OR TO RENDER INVALID A CLAIM BY THE DECLARANT 
8 AGAINST ANOTHER." AND I THINK THIS IS SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE 
9 DEFENSE IS (INAUDIBLE) SO UNDER 804 IT'S ADMISSIBLE AS 
10 HEARSAY AND UNDER 25—I'M JUST GOING TO HAVE TO HEAR IT UNDER 
11 THAT—25-5-1. 
12 A LONG WAY OF RULING, BUT THE RECORD IS CLEAR AND I 
13 THINK YOU WANTED A CLEAR RECORD. 
14 MR. BIRD: YES. 
15 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) NOW, MAX, LET'S GET BACK TO THE TIME 
16 THAT YOU MADE THE ATTEMPT. IF THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO 
17 ON MAY 1ST AND THE FIRST PAYMENT WAS DUE ON MAY 1ST OF 1975, 
18 APPROXIMATELY WHAT TIME WOULD THIS CONVERSATION OCCURRED THAT 
19 YOU'RE ABOUT TO TELL US. 
20 MR. BIRD: CAN WE HAVE A STATEMENT AS TO WHO WAS 
21 PRESENT? 
22 MR. KUNZ: WELL, I WILL. 
23 THE COURT: OBJECTION AS TO FOUNDATION? 
24 MR. BIRD: YES. 
25 I THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
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1 MR. KUNZ: WELL, FIRST OF ALL I'M TRYING TO GET TO 
2 THE TIME TO LAY A FOUNDATION. THAT'S ALL I'M TRYING TO DO. 
3 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DO YOU RECALL ABOUT WHEN THIS 
4 OCCURRED? 
5 A THIS WOULD'VE OCCURRED IN MAY, MAYBE LAST OF APRIL, 
6 EARLY MAY. 
7 Q OF '75? 
8 A OF '75. 
9 Q OKAY. AND WHERE DID THIS OCCUR? 
10 A THIS OCCURRED IN MY FIELD WHICH WE CALLED THE KNOLL 
11 IN CLAY BASIN. 
12 Q OKAY. IS THAT LOCATED ON THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE 
13 SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT? 
14 A THAT'S TRUE. 
15 Q AND WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE TIME? 
16 A A CLOSE AND DEAR FRIEND OF THE FAMILY JERRY CARROLL. 
17 Q JERRY CARROLL? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q AND WHO ELSE? 
20 A AND MY FATHER AND ME. 
21 Q OKAY. THERE WAS JUST THREE OF YOU? 
22 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
23 Q ALL RIGHT. COULD YOU RELATE TO ME THE—WHAT 
24 HAPPENED IN REGARD TO YOUR ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE PAYMENT? 
25 A MY FATHER CAME DOWN TO THE FIELD. I AND JERRY WAS 
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1 DOWN IN THE FIELD. I HAD DONE A LOT OF WORK IN MY FIELD BY 
2 BURYING PIPE AND PUTTING SPRINKLER SYSTEMS INTO THESE FIELDS 
3 AND WE WERE DOWN THERE WORKING. MY FATHER CAME DOWN AND WE 
4 VISITED THERE. AND HE ASKED ME, HE SAYS, "MAX," HE SAYS, 
5 "WHAT IS—HOW IS IT TO YOU THAT I CAN TAKE SOME OF YOUR COWS 
6 OVER TO MICHAEL"—WHO IS MY BROTHER THAT WAS TRYING TO GET 
7 STARTED IN THE DAIRY BUSINESS. AND HE SAYS, "COULD WE—DO YOU 
8 THINK YOU COULD LET HIM HAVE SOME OF THEM COWS?" 
9 AND I SAID, "WELL, SURE." I SAID, "I OWE YOU—THIS 
10 PLACE HAS GOT TO BE PAID FOR, I OWE YOU MONEY." 
11 AND HE SAID, "WELL, WE'LL APPLY THIS TO THE PLACE." 
12 AND I SAID, "WELL, SURE, BUT I DON'T HAVE NO IDEA 
13 WHAT MICHAEL WANTS." I SAYS, "DOES HE WANT MILK COWS THAT IS 
14 MILKING? DOES HE WANT SPRINGERS? WHAT DOES HE WANT?" I 
15 SAYS, "HE'LL JUST HAVE TO COME AND TAKE SOME COWS FROM THE 
16 HERD OF COWS." WE HAD—AT THAT TIME WE WAS MILKING— 
17 Q WELL, I DON'T THINK YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN HOW MANY 
18 COWS YOU HAD. 
19 A WELL, OKAY. BUT ANYWAY HE LEFT. MY FATHER LEFT. 
20 AND HE CAME BACK. AND HIS REPLY WAS, "MAX," HE SAYS, "YOU 
21 DON'T HAVE A COW ON YOUR PLACE GOOD ENOUGH FOR MICHAEL." 
22 AND I SAID, "DAD, THAT'S ALL I'VE GOT. THIS IS WHAT 
23 THERE IS, THAT'S ALL THAT'S HERE." I SAYS, "THAT THERE'S— 
24 AND HE SAID, AND HE WAS MAD AND HE WAS UPSET. AND 
25 | I SAID, "WHAT DO YOU WANT WITH THIS PLACE? HOW ARE WE GOING 
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1 TO MAKE THESE PAYMENTS OR WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO? 
2 HE SAYS, "AREN'T YOU IN THE PROCESS OF"--WELL HE 
3 COULD SEE I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SPRINKLING THIS GROUND. AND 
4 HE SAYS, "YOU GOT MORE WORK YOU WANT TO DO?" 
5 AND I SAID, "WELL, SURE." 
6 HE SAYS, "YOU GO AHEAD AND PUT IT INTO THE PLACE." 
7 Q PUT WHAT INTO THE PLACE? 
8 A PUT THE MONEY. HE SAYS, "IF YOU GOT THE MONEY TO 
9 PAY THIS, PUT IT INTO THIS PLACE." 
10 Q AND AT THAT TIME DID YOU HAVE THE $10,000? 
11 A AND HE WAS UPSET. HE WAS UPSET AT THAT TIME AND HE 
12 TOLD ME AT THAT TIME—I SAYS, "WELL, WHAT ABOUT THIS PLACE 
13 THING?" 
14 AND HE SAYS, "WHEN I WANT THAT PLACE PAYMENT, I WILL 
15 ASK YOU FOR THAT PLACE PAYMENT." HE SAYS, "THAT PLACE PAYMENT 
16 WILL NOT DO ME NO GOOD BECAUSE OF TAXES." 
17 Q WHEN YOU SAY "PLACE PAYMENT," WAS THAT THE $10,000 
18 PAYMENT? 
19 A YES, THE $10,000 ON THAT CONTRACT. 
20 Q AND AT THAT TIME WERE YOU PREPARED TO HAVE—DID YOU 
21 HAVE THE $10,000 TO MAKE THAT PAYMENT? 
22 A I SURE DID. 
23 Q OKAY. AND YOU MENTIONED THAT YOUR FATHER WAS UPSET. 
24 WAS HE UPSET AT YOU? 
25 A HE WAS UPSET AT MY BROTHER MICHAEL. 
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1 Q AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE? BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T TAKE YOUR 
2 COWS? 
3 A BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT A COW ON MY PLACE THAT WAS 
4 GOOD ENOUGH FOR HIM IS WHAT HE TOLD ME. 
5 Q AND DID YOU HAVE—DO YOU RECALL ANY FURTHER 
6 CONVERSATION REGARDING THE STATEMENT THAT YOU MADE THAT THE 
7 PAYMENT WOULDN'T DO ANY GOOD BECAUSE OF TAXES? DID HE 
8 ELABORATE ON THAT AT ALL? 
9 A NO, HE NEVER ELABORATED ON IT. MY DAD ALWAYS MADE 
10 ME FEEL THAT WHEN HE WANTED SOMETHING HE WOULD COME AND GET 
11 IT. HE'D ASK FOR IT AND THAT'S THE WAY HE D O N E — 
12 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THAT AS NON RESPONSIVE. 
13 MR. KUNZ: WELL, EXCUSE ME. 
14 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DID YOU GET THAT FEELING FROM THAT 
15 CONVERSATION THAT OCCURRED THAT DAY ON THE KNOLL? 
16 A I GOT THAT FEELING FROM MY FATHER ALL MY LIFE. 
17 Q OKAY. NOW, DID YOUR FATHER EVER COME AND GET 
18 ANYTHING FROM YOU? DID HE EVER COME AND ASK YOU FOR ANYTHING, 
19 ANY MONEY OR ANYTHING ELSE? 
20 A HE NEVER COME AND ASKED ME FOR MONEY. HE CAME AND 
21 GOT DIFFERENT THINGS THAT I HAD, YES. 
22 Q OKAY. WHAT DID HE COME AND GET? 
>3 A THEY INVOLVED SOME CALVES, SOME BABY CALVES THAT WAS 
!4 WHAT WE CALL REPLACEMENT CALVES— 
5 J Q DO YOU RECALL HOW MANY CALVES HE CAME AND GOT? 
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1 A NO, I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY. UPON UNTIL WE SOLD THE 
2 MILK COWS IN '79, THIS IS PURELY A GUESS, I WOULD ESTIMATE 
3 BETWEEN 15 AND 20 HEAD OF CALVES. 
4 Q AND WHAT WERE THOSE CALVES WORTH AT THAT TIME? 
5 [ A AT THAT TIME THOSE CALVES WERE WORTH BETWEEN $50 AND 
6 $100. 
7 Q OKAY. 
8 A PER HEAD. 
9 THE COURT: HOW MANY CALVES? 
10 THE WITNESS: I SAID BETWEEN 15 AND 20. I DON'T 
11 KNOW EXACTLY. BUT THIS WAS IN A PERIOD—THIS PERIOD WAS FROM 
12 THE TIME I BOUGHT THE PLACE UNTIL THE PERIOD OF 1979. 
13 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) NOW, DID HE COME AND GET ANYTHING 
14 ELSE FROM YOU? 
15 A YES. THERE WERE CORRAL PANELS—I RECALL CORRAL 
16 PANELS, POSTS, WIRE—WELL, JUST WHATEVER. HE COME AND GOT 
17 WHAT WE CALL A BIG GUN. 
18 Q WHAT'S A BIG GUN? 
19 A A BIG GUN IS JUST A BIG SPRINKLER ON KIND OF A CART 
20 IS WHAT IT IS. 
21 Q AND WAS THERE EVER DISCUSSION AT THE TIME THAT YOUR 
22 FATHER WOULD COME AND GET THESE ITEMS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE 
23 WAS GOING TO PAY YOU OR ANY OF THOSE KINDS OF THINGS? 
24 A NO, NO. HE JUST ALWAYS MADE ME FEEL THAT THIS WOULD 
25 ALL BE APPLIED TO THE PURCHASE OF THIS PLACE. BECAUSE HE TOLD 
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1 ME THAT HE TRYING TO MAKE THINGS WORK EVEN FOR ALL OF US. 
2 YOU'VE GOT TO REALIZE THERE WAS FIVE OF US. 
3 Q OKAY. 
4 J A AND HE KNEW AND I UNDERSTOOD MY— 
5 MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. I OBJECT TO THIS AS NOT 
6 RESPONSIVE. VOLUNTEER STATEMENT. 
7 THE COURT: WELL, I SUSTAIN IT ON THE BASIS OF HIS 
8 INTERPRETATION OF WHAT HIS FATHER KNEW. IS THAT THE BASIS OF 
9 YOUR OBJECTION? 
10 MR. BIRD: YES, AND IT'S A RAMBLING STATEMENT THAT 
11 ISN'T RESPONSIVE TO THE QUESTION AND NOT MATERIAL. 
12 THE COURT: SUSTAINED AND STRICKEN AS TO THE 
13 FATHER'S FEELINGS AND WHAT HE KNEW. YOU MAY TRY TO JUST 
14 ANSWER THE QUESTION. WE DON'T WANT YOU TO NOT GIVE A COMPLETE 
15 ANSWER. WE EXPECT THAT YOU'LL GIVE A COMPLETE ANSWER, BUT 
16 LISTEN TO THE QUESTION AND ANSWER THAT QUESTION AND HE'LL 
17 PRESENT THIS TO YOU A PIECE AT A TIME IF YOU'LL JUST ANSWER 
18 THE QUESTION YOU'RE GIVEN AND HE'LL GET INTO EVERYTHING THAT 
19 HE THINKS IS IMPORTANT. 
20 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, WHAT DO YOU VALUE—WHAT KIND OF 
21 DOLLAR VALUE WOULD YOU PLACE ON THE VARIOUS ITEMS THAT YOUR 
22 FATHER CAME AND GOT FROM YOU BETWEEN '74 AND '79? 
23 A I VALUED THEM RIGHT AT $10,000. 
24 Q OKAY. NOW, OTHER THAN THE OCCASIONAL GIVING YOUR 
25 J FATHER VARIOUS THINGS AT HIS REQUEST, WAS THERE EVER ANY OTHER 
I 
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1 DISCUSSION IN REGARD IN YOUR ATTEMPTING TO PAY HIM MONEY? 
2 J A NO. 
3 Q YOU NEVER HAD OTHER CONVERSATION WITH YOUR FATHER? 
4 A NOT SINCE MAY. 
5 Q WHAT ABOUT THE SALE OF CATTLE? WAS THERE EVER ANY 
6 CONVERSATION BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR FATHER AT THE TIME YOU SOLD 
7 YOUR DAIRY HERD? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q OKAY. NOW, COULD YOU DESCRIBE—FIRST OF ALL, WHEN 
10 DID THAT OCCUR? 
11 A '79. 
12 Q AND WHERE DID THIS CONVERSATION OCCUR? 
13 A AT MY PLACE. 
14 Q WHEN YOU SAY "YOUR PLACE" WHERE ON YOUR PLACE? 
15 A WELL, THE RANCH. 
16 Q OKAY. BUT WHERE ON THE RANCH? 
17 A IN THE YARDS—OUT IN THE YARDS AND THE CORRALS. 
18 Q OKAY. AND WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE TIME? 
19 A JOYCE, MY WIFE. 
20 Q AND WHO ELSE? 
21 A MY DAD. 
22 Q WERE YOU THERE? 
23 A YES, MYSELF. 
24 Q NO ONE ELSE? 
25 I A NO, AS I RECALL. 
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1 Q RELATE TO ME AS BEST YOU RECALL THE CONVERSATION 
2 THAT YOU HAD THAT DAY WITH YOUR FATHER. 
3 A I SOLD MY MILK COWS. AND THEY WERE TWO INDIVIDUALS 
4 THAT BOUGHT THAT HERD OF COWS. 
5 MR. BIRD: EXCUSE ME. I WANT TO RENEW MY OBJECTION 
6 BECAUSE THIS WAS AFTER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT. AND AS I ARGUED-
7 -AS I STATED PREVIOUSLY, I THINK THE POSITION UNDER THE 
8 STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS DIFFERENT UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT--
9 THE COURT: DO YOU MEAN TRUST? 
10 MR. BIRD: THEN IT WAS BEFORE THE TRUSTEES MUST ACT 
11 TOGETHER AND ONLY ONE WAS PRESENT AND I OBJECT TO IT FOR THAT 
12 REASON. 
13 MR. KUNZ: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S BEEN NO EVIDENCE 
14 PRESENTED THAT THIS ESCROW AGREEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE 
15 MONEY WAS EVER ASSIGNED TO THE TRUST, NOR WAS THERE EVER A 
16 DEED FROM THE TRUST PLACED INTO ESCROW. THE DOCUMENTS THAT 
17 WERE PLACED WITH THE ESCROW AGENT WERE THE ORIGINAL ESCROW 
18 AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN GEORGE, LARUE, MAX AND JOYCE 
19 AND THE DEED, IN FACT, IS FROM GEORGE AND LARUE AS HUSBAND AND 
20 WIFE TO MAX AND JOYCE. 
21 THE COURT: AGAIN, I THINK YOU'RE ASKING THE COURT 
22 1 TO RULE UPON SOMETHING THAT'S A LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE 
23 COURT WILL REACH BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND I'VE FRAMED IT AS 
24 AN OBJECTION TO THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. YOU MAY WELL BE 
>5 fl RIGHT IN WHAT YOU SAY—A CONCLUSION THAT THE COURT REACH—BUT 
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1 THAT DOESN'T PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
2 I MR. BIRD: I SIMPLY WANT TO RENEW IT BECAUSE THIS 
3 WAS AFTER THE TRUST AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED. 
4 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT AND, I HAVEN'T READ 
5 ALL THESE DOCUMENTS, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE DEFENDANT 
6 I WASN'T A—WITHOUT RULING, I'M NOT RULING ON THIS—THE 
7 f DEFENDANT WASN'T A PARTY TO THE TRUST AGREEMENT AS A GRANTOR— 
8 WAS HE A GRANTOR ON THE TRUST? 
9 I MR. KUNZ: HE WAS— 
10 J THE COURT: HE WAS A BENEFICIARY. 
11 I MR. KUNZ: HE WAS NAMED AS A TRUSTEE OF THE FAMILY 
12 TRUST— 
13 J THE COURT: A SUCCESSOR. 
14 J MR. KUNZ: —AND HE'S A—AS A SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE, 
15 EXCUSE ME, AND ALSO A BENEFICIARY OF THAT TRUST. 
16 THE COURT: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE OPERATIVE 
17 DOCUMENT IS THE DEED AND INITIAL AGREEMENT, THE ESCROW 
18 AGREEMENT, AND THAT—YOU KNOW—THE AFFECT OF THE LATER TRUST 
19 AGREEMENT AT LEAST DOESN'T PREVENT THE COURT FROM RECEIVING 
20 THE DOCUMENTS. 
21 J I'M GOING TO OVERRULE THE OBJECTION. AND IT MAY BE 
22 THAT HE JUST NOT BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE ESCROW AGREEMENT IN 
23 TERMS OF WHAT HIS OBLIGATIONS WERE. 
24 YOU MAY PROCEED. 
25 I Q (BY MR. KUNZ) IN THAT REGARD, MAX, DID YOU EVER— 
1 
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1 WERE YOU EVER TOLD BY ANYONE THAT YOU NEEDED TO MAKE PAYMENTS 
2 TO PAUL BARTON? 
3 A NO. 
4 Q DID YOU KNOW THAT THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND THE 
5 WARRANTY DEED TO YOUR PLACE WAS DELIVERED TO PAUL BARTON? 
6 A NO. 
7 Q ALL RIGHT. LET'S GET BACK TO 1979 WHEN YOU WERE IN 
8 YOUR CORRALS WITH YOUR FATHER AND YOUR WIFE. WHY DON'T YOU GO 
9 AHEAD AND RELATE YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE CONVERSATION. 
10 A WELL, MY FATHER CAME DOWN TO THE PLACE AND I TOLD 
11 HIM THAT I HAD SOLD THE MILK COWS AND THEY WERE GOING TO GO TO 
12 TWO INDIVIDUALS—TWO DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS. WALLY STEPHENSON 
13 WAS THE ONE FELLOW AND JENKINS—HOWARD JENKINS' FAMILY WAS THE 
14 OTHER. 
15 I SAID, "FATHER, I WANT YOU TO—YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE 
16 TO TAKE PART OF THIS MONEY." OR TAKE THIS MONEY. I WANTED 
17 HIM TO TAKE IT ALL, BUT HE SAYS, "I DON'T WANT NONE OF IT. I 
18 CAN'T USE IT." 
19 Q OKAY. WAIT JUST A MOMENT. YOU SAY YOU WANTED HIM 
20 TO TAKE IT ALL? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY ALL? 
23 A I WANTED HIM TO TAKE BOTH SALES. THEY WAS TWO 
24 DIFFERENT—THEY WAS GOING TO BE TWO DIFFERENT—THERE WAS 
25 A ACTUALLY TWO DIFFERENT SALES AND I WANTED HIM TO TAKE BOTH 
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1 SALES OF THOSE CATTLE. 
2 Q AND WHAT WAS THE DOLLAR VALUE OF EACH OF THOSE 
3 SALES, DO YOU RECALL? 
4 I A IT'S RIGHT THERE ON THAT PAPER. THE ONE OF THEM WAS 
5 RIGHT AT $25,000 AND THE OTHER ONE WAS 56, 58—HOW MUCH IS IT? 
6 IT WAS $58,000. 
7 Q AND SO YOU SAY YOU OFFERED YOUR FATHER THE TWO 
8 SALES, 58,000 AND 25,000? 
9 J A YES. 
10 Q AND WHAT DID YOUR FATHER SAY? 
11 A HE SAYS, "I DON'T WANT THEM. I CAN'T USE THAT 
12 MONEY." HE SAYS, "I CAN'T USE THAT MONEY." 
13 Q EXCUSE ME, MAX. DID HE MAKE—DID HE EXPLAIN WHY HE 
14 COULDN'T USE THE MONEY? 
15 A HE SAID IT WOULD JUST GO TO TAXES. I DIDN'T KNOW 
16 HIS INCOME. HE SAID IT WOULD JUST GO TO TAXES. 
17 Q SO— 
18 A AND I REPLIED THAT YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE ONE 
19 AND SO HE AGREED TO TAKE THE ONE DRAFT. 
20 Q AND— 
21 A AND IT WAS THE SMALLER. HE SAYS, "I WANT THE—IF 
22 YOUR INSISTING I'LL TAKE THE SMALLER DRAFT." AND THAT WAS THE 
23 WALLY STEPHENSON DRAFT. 
24 Q AND THAT WAS THE—WELL, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO 



























AND ASK IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY THAT DOCUMENT FOR ME, PLEASE. 
A NOW, WHAT DID YOU—I MISUNDERSTOOD YOU HERE, RON. 
Q COULD YOU IDENTIFY WHAT THAT DOCUMENT REPRESENTS? 
A THIS DOCUMENT REPRESENTS THE DRAFT THAT MY FATHER 
RECEIVED FROM THOSE CATTLE. 
Q OKAY. AND DOES THAT HELP YOU DETERMINE WHAT THE 
AMOUNT THAT ACTUALLY WENT TO YOUR FATHER AS THE SALE OF YOUR 
CATTLE? 
A TO THE PENNY, $24,980. 
Q OKAY. 
MR. KUNZ: I'D MOVE FOR THE ADMISSION OF D-7 TO 
ILLUSTRATE THE VALUE. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU SEEN D-7? 
MR. BIRD: YES, I'VE SEEN IT. I OBJECT TO IT FOR 
THE REASON THAT—WELL, I OBJECT TO IT BECAUSE THE CATTLE WERE 
NOT—DID NOT BELONG TO HIM, THEY BELONGED TO GEORGE, AND I'M 
GOING TO GO INTO THAT. AND I OBJECT TO THIS AS BEING A VALID 
DRAFT ON THE BASIS THAT THE WITNESS HAS TESTIFIED, BUT I THINK 
THE COURT'S GOING TO RECEIVE IT OVER MY OBJECTION. 
MR. KUNZ: MY PURPOSE, YOUR HONOR, WAS TO DETERMINE 
THE AMOUNT, NOT NECESSARILY TO DETERMINE WHO OWNED THE COWS OR 
ANY OF THOSE KINDS OF THINGS. AND, OF COURSE, HE'S TESTIFIED 
NOW SO I'LL WITHDRAW THE EXHIBIT IF THAT WOULD HELP. 
THE COURT: WELL, DO YOU WANT ME TO RULE UPON IT? 
MR. KUNZ: YEAH, GO AHEAD AND RULE. 
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1 THE COURT: I'LL OVERRULE IT. IT WILL BE RECEIVED. 
2 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) NOW, YOU SAY YOUR FATHER DID ACCEPT 
3 THAT AMOUNT? 
4 A YES, SIR. 
5 Q AND HOW DID HE RECEIVE THE MONEY? 
6 A FROM WHERE WALLY STEPHENSON BORROWED THE MONEY— 
7 WHERE HE GOT HIS—FHA. THERE WAS AN FHA. I DON'T KNOW HOW 
8 THEY DO THEIR MONEY, WHETHER IT WAS A CHECK, CASH OR—BUT 
9 THAT'S HOW HE RECEIVED THE MONEY THROUGH THIS FHA. 
10 Q DID YOUR FATHER EVER ACKNOWLEDGE TO YOU THAT HE HAD 
11 RECEIVED THE MONEY? 
12 A YES. 
13 Q OKAY. NOW, MR. FISHER, MR. BIRD HAS INDICATED THAT 
14 THAT WASN'T FOR THE SALE OF YOUR COWS, THAT WAS FOR THE SALE 
15 OF GEORGE AND LARUE'S COWS; IS THAT TRUE? 
16 A THAT'S NOT TRUE. 
17 Q OKAY. DID YOU KEEP ANY COWS FOR YOUR PARENTS? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q OKAY. WHAT COWS DID YOU KEEP FOR YOUR PARENTS? 
20 A I KEPT—I DON'T KNOW EXACT NUMBER, BUT I WOULD SAY 
21 BETWEEN 12 TO 14 HEAD OF THOSE COWS AT THE TIME I PURCHASED 
22 THE PLACE IN '75 WAS HIS— 
23 Q EXCUSE ME. THE DOCUMENTS SHOW, AND I THINK YOU'VE 
24 PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED, THAT YOU PURCHASED IT IN '74. 
25 U A WELL, OKAY, '74. BUT THEY WERE THERE. HE HAD SOLD 
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1 HIS MILK COWS. HIS COWS AND I NEVER TOOK—GOT NONE OF HIS 
2 PRODUCING COWS, THE HEIFERS OR NOTHING, BECAUSE I HAD MY OWN 
3 HERD BY THAT TIME BUILT AND THERE WAS SOME OF THESE COWS THAT 
4 WAS YOUR OLDER COWS. WELL, WE CALL THEM KIND OF CALLS, BUT 
5 WERE STILL IN A MILKING LACTATION. 
6 AND HE SAYS, "MAX, JUST KEEP THOSE COWS AND WEAR 
7 THEM OUT AND SELL THEM AND SELL THEM TO ME—JUST SELL THEM— 
8 AND THAT'S WHAT I DONE. I TOOK THE COWS AND WHEN THEY WERE 
9 GONE I HAULED THEM TO THE SALE. 
10 Q OKAY. EXCUSE ME. 
11 WHEN YOU SAY WHEN THEY WERE GONE, WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
12 A I MEAN WHEN THEY WERE WORE OUT AND NO GOOD TO 
13 NOBODY. THEY WOULDN'T PRODUCE MILK. IF A MILK COW DON'T 
14 PRODUCE MILK AND YOU'RE IN THE MILKING BUSINESS, YOU DON'T 
15 NEED HER ON THE PLACE. YOU DISPOSE OF THEM. 
16 Q NOW, DID YOU BREED ANY OF THOSE COWS SO THAT YOU 
17 CONTINUED TO MILK THEM OR FOR OTHER LACTATION PERIODS? 
18 A OH, NO. THEY WERE OLDER COWS. THEY WERE SOME THREE 
19 TITTED COWS. THEY WERE COWS THAT THE PEOPLE THAT COME BOUGHT 
20 THE COWS DIDN'T WANT. 
21 Q OKAY. AND DID YOU EVER SELL THOSE COWS? 
22 A YES. 
23 Q AND WHEN DID YOU DO THAT? 
24 A IN '75, '76. BETWEEN THAT PERIOD OF TIME. 
25 Q AND DID YOU GIVE YOUR FATHER AND MOTHER THE MONEY I 
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1 FOR THOSE COWS? 
2 A I DIDN'T RECEIVE THE MONEY. I FOLLOWED THEM COWS TO 
3 THE AUCTION AND THOSE COWS WERE PACKING HIS BRAND. THEY 
4 WEREN'T MY COWS. YOU CAN'T SELL OTHER PEOPLE'S CATTLE. I 
5 HAULED THEM CATTLE TO THE SALE AND THAT CHECK WAS MADE AND 
6 I DELIVERED RIGHT TO MY FOLKS. 
7 Q AND THAT WAS IN '75? 
8 A BETWEEN '75 AND '76. 
9 Q OKAY. BUT THE COWS IN 1979, WHOSE BRAND DID THEY 
10 HAVE ON THEM? 
11 A THEY PACKED MY BRAND. 
12 Q WHEN YOU HAD THIS CONVERSATION IN 1979 WITH YOUR 
13 FATHER ABOUT TRYING TO GET HIM TO TAKE BOTH OF THE PAYMENTS, 
14 OR BOTH OF THE CHECKS FOR THE SALE OF THE CATTLE, DID YOU HAVE 
15 ANY FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH HIM ABOUT HOW IT WAS YOU WERE 
16 GOING TO PAY FOR THE RANCH AND GET IT IN YOUR NAME? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q OKAY. WAS THERE EVER A POINT IN TIME AFTER 1979 
19 THAT YOU HAD CONVERSATION WITH EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF YOUR 
20 PARENTS IN REGARD TO PAYMENTS FOR THE RANCH? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q AND WHEN DID THE NEXT ONE OCCUR? 
23 A IT OCCURRED AT THE TIME WE HAD TO DESTROY THE OLD 
24 HOME. 
25 I Q OKAY. 
I 
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1 I A AND THAT WAS '78. 
2 Q '78? 
3 A '78, OH, NO. '88. '88, '89. AND I HAD—WE HAD 
4 REMODELED THIS HOME PREVIOUS YEARS BEFORE AND DONE A LOT OF 
5 WORK ON IT. MY BROTHER-IN-LAW'S A CARPENTER. I WASN'T— 
6 DIDN'T CLAIM TO BE A CARPENTER AND I HAD A LOT OF HELP DOING 
7 THIS. BUT ANYWAY, WE DIDN'T—THE OLD HOME WAS AN OLD HOME 
8 THAT WAS BUILT ON THE GROUND AND THERE WAS A LOT OF IT YOU 
9 COULDN'T GET UNDER. 
10 Q OKAY. I DON'T THINK YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN HOW THE OLD 
11 HOME WAS BUILT, BUT, MAX, YOU SAY THIS OCCURRED IN 1988 OR 
12 '89? 
13 A YES. 
14 Q AND THIS IS WHEN THE HOME WAS TORE DOWN? 
15 A THIS IS AT THE TIME THE OLD—YES. 
16 Q BEFORE WE GET TO THAT, YOUR MOTHER HAS TESTIFIED 
17 ABOUT A CONVERSATION THAT OCCURRED AT YOUR HOME AT THE TIME 
18 APPARENTLY ONE OF THE CORNERS WERE FALLING AND YOU WERE 
19 REMODELING THE HOME. DO YOU RECALL EVER CONVERSING WITH YOUR 
20 MOTHER AND FATHER AT THAT TIME? 
21 A THAT'S AT THE TIME IT WAS. THAT'S AT THE TIME THAT 
22 THIS TOOK PLACE. I TORE OFF PART OF THE OLD HOME AND HAD GOT 
23 UNDER THE OTHER PART AND WE DUG TRENCHES BACK UNDER IT AND 
24 SEEN THAT THE OLD HOME WAS ROTTED. IT WAS UNSAVEABLE. IT WAS 
25 UNSAVEABLE. I CALLED MY FATHER— 
1 
1 Q WAIT JUST A— 
2 A —AND I CALLED MY MOTHER. 
3 Q WAIT JUST A MOMENT. BEFORE YOU GET INTO THAT, SO 
4 THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT ABOUT WHAT YOU'RE TO DESCRIBE, IS 
5 THIS THE SAME INCIDENT THAT YOUR MOTHER PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED 
6 TO, OR WAS THERE ANOTHER INCIDENT THAT THEY CAME BY WHEN YOU 
7 WERE REMODELING THE HOME? 
8 A THIS IS THE WAY I RECALL THAT THAT WAS WHEN THAT 
9 INCIDENT TOOK PLACE. 
10 Q AND COULD YOU RELATE, FIRST OF ALL, WHERE THE 
11 CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE? 
12 A IN MY—IN WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE OLD HOME. 
13 Q AND WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE TIME THE CONVERSATION 
14 TOOK PLACE? 
15- A THERE WAS ME, MY WIFE, MY FATHER AND MY MOTHER. 
16 Q OKAY. WERE ANYONE ELSE PRESENT? 
17 A NO. WAIT, YES. YES, THERE WAS. THERE WAS CHICO 
18 CAPWELL AND PEGGY CAPWELL. 
19 Q CHICO AND PEGGY CAPWELL? 
20 A BUT NOT—THEY DIDN'T HEAR THE CONFERENCE I HAD WITH 
21 DAD AND MOTHER, BUT THEY WERE THERE WHEN DAD AND MOTHER WERE 
22 THERE TO LOOK AT THE OLD HOME. 
23 Q ALL RIGHT. TELL ME ABOUT THE CONVERSATION THAT 
24 OCCURRED BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARENTS. 



























MR. KUNZ: I THINK WE'VE ESTABLISHED THAT IT'S 1979 
IN WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE OLD HOME WITH CHICO AND PEGGY CAPWELL 
PRESENT, BUT THEY WERE NOT PRESENT TO HEAR THIS CONVERSATION. 
THE COURT: IS THAT HIS TESTIMONY? I THOUGHT HIS 
TESTIMONY WAS '88 OR '89. 
THE WITNESS: '88 OR '89. 
MR. KUNZ: CORRECT. HIS TESTIMONY WAS '88 OR '89 
AND THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THAT, MR. BIRD? 
MR. BIRD: I UNDERSTOOD '88 OR '89 WAS WHEN HE BUILT 
THE NEW HOME, TORE DOWN THE OLD ONE, AND THAT THIS 
CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE DURING REMODELING. 
THE COURT: NO, THAT'S NOT HIS TESTIMONY. 
MR. BIRD: OH, I'M—ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT. 
MR. KUNZ: HIS TESTIMONY WAS THAT THE CONVERSATION 
TOOK PLACE AT THE TIME OF TEARING DOWN THE HOME. 
THE WITNESS: TRUE. 
Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DO YOU RECALL ANY CONVERSATION 
OCCURRING AT YOUR HOME WITH YOUR MOTHER AND FATHER AT THE TIME 
YOU WERE REMODELING? 
A YES, THERE WAS QUITE A FEW CONVERSATIONS, BUT 
NOTHING TO DO WITH— 
Q WITH THE— 
A YES, YES. 
Q OKAY. AND DURING THE OTHER SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS 
96 
1 WAS THERE EVER ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT PAYMENTS OWED ON THE 
2 PROPERTY? 
3 A NO. 
4 Q OKAY. NOW, AT THE TIME YOU HAD YOUR PARENTS UP 
5 THERE TO DISCUSS DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOME, IS THAT WHEN THE 
6 CORNER WAS FALLING DOWN? 
7 J A YES. 
8 & Q AND WAS THE CORNER FALLING DOWN AT A PRIOR TIME WHEN 
9 YOU REMODELED THE HOUSE? 
10 A I DIDN'T THINK SO, BUT IT WAS. 
11 Q OKAY. 
12 A I THINK NOW— 
13 Q BUT WERE YOU AWARE OF IT AND DID YOU DISCUSS THAT 
14 WITH YOUR PARENTS? 
15- A NOT WHEN WE WAS REMODELING. 
16 Q OKAY. 
17 A BECAUSE WE HAD REMODELED THE HOME QUITE A FEW YEARS 
18 BEFORE THE—NOT QUITE A FEW, BUT FIVE OR SIX YEARS—I DON'T 
19 REMEMBER THE YEARS, BUT WE'D REDONE THE HOME. 
20 Q ALL RIGHT. MAX, AT THE TIME THEN THAT YOU HAD 
21 CONVERSATION WITH YOUR PARENTS IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE CORNER 
22 OF THE HOUSE FALLING THROUGH, WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN AT THE TIME 
!3 THE HOUSE WAS BEING DEMOLISHED? 
4 A YES. 



























DID OCCUR BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARENTS. COULD YOU RELATE THAT 
CONVERSATION THE WAY IT OCCURRED AS BEST TO YOUR RECOLLECTION? 
A THE BEST I RECOLLECT IS I WAS UP—QUITE UPSET WITH 
THE IDEA THAT WE HAD PUT A LOT OF WORK AND TIME INTO 
REMODELING THE OLD STRUCTURE AND WE LOST THAT, WHICH AMOUNTED 
TO QUITE A LOT. AND WE ENDED UP HAVING TO DESTROY THE OLD 
HOME. AND I BROUGHT MY FATHER AND MOTHER UP TO LOOK. 
Q OKAY. FIRST OF ALL, DID YOU INVITE YOUR FATHER AND 
MOTHER UP TO YOUR HOME? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q OKAY. GO AHEAD AND EXPLAIN. 
A I FELT THAT THEY SHOULD SEE THE SITUATION BECAUSE 
THEY WAS STILL—THEY WAS STILL DEBT OWED ON THIS PLACE. I 
KNOWED I STILL OWED MONEY ON THIS PLACE. AND I KNOW THAT IF 
I HAD TO DESTROY THIS HOME AND BUILD A NEW ONE THAT IT COULD 
PUT ME IN A HARDSHIP. 
Q OKAY. SO DESCRIBE THE CONVERSATION THEN THAT TOOK 
PLACE. 
A WELL, MY FATHER ASKED ME IF I COULD BUILD A HOME. 
I SAID, "I CAN BUILD A HOME, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER I CAN 
MAKE MY PLACE PAYMENTS." 
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU OFFER ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE IN 
REGARD TO— 
MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. THAT'S LEADING THE 
WITNESS. I OBJECT TO IT. 
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1 I THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
2 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) OKAY. GO AHEAD AND JUST FINISH 
3 RELATING THE CONVERSATION, MAX, AS BEST YOU CAN. 
4 A WELL, I TOLD MY FATHER THAT THERE WAS A PLACE—AT 
5 THAT TIME THERE WAS A HOME AND—I DON'T KNOW THE ACRES—TWO OR 
6 THREE ACRES THAT WAS DOWN THE ROAD FROM THERE TWO MILES. 
7 DON'T QUOTE ME THE EXACT DISTANCE, BUT AROUND TWO MILES. THAT 
8 WAS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME FOR LESS MONEY I FELT THAN WOULD 
9 1 TAKE TO BUILD ME A NEW HOME HERE. 
10 J Q OKAY. AND WHO OWNED THAT HOME AT THAT TIME? 
11 A JAMES AND HELENE OMAN. 
12 Q JAMES AND HELENE OMAN? 
13 A YES. 
14 THE COURT: WHAT'S THE LAST NAME? 
15 THE WITNESS: OMAN. 
16 THE COURT: O-M-A-N? 
17 THE WITNESS: UH HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE) 
18 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) ALL RIGHT. PROCEED. 
19 A AND MY FATHER SAYS, "YOU KNOW THAT YOU CAN'T DO 
20 THAT." HE SAYS, "YOU CAN'T LIVE OFF ONE OF THESE RANCHES AND 
21 RUN IT." HE SAYS, "IT'S A DETERRENT TO YOU." HE SAYS, "IF 
22 YOU'RE GOING TO RUN A PLACE YOU'VE GOT TO LIVE ON IT." 
23 Q OKAY. AND WHAT WAS YOUR RESPONSE? 
24 A I SAYS, "WELL, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU ENFORCE ME TO 
25 PAY THESE PAYMENTS? I CAN'T DO IT." 
99 
1 AND HE SAYS, "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT." HE SAYS, "I'M 
2 GETTING THIS TAKEN CARE OF AS QUICK AS I CAN TO MAKE IT EQUAL 
3 WITH YOU KIDS." THAT'S THE WAY HE MADE ME FEEL. 
4 Q OKAY. BUT WHAT DID HE SAY TO MAKE YOU FEEL THAT 
5 WAY? DO YOU RECALL— 
6 I A HE SAYS, "YOU BETTER BUILD A HOME." 
7 Q OKAY. AND WAS THERE A CONVERSATION REGARDING YOU 
8 NEEDED TO START MAKING PAYMENTS AND JOYCE NEEDED TO GET 
9 RECORDS— 
10 MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. THAT'S LEADING AGAIN. 
11 I'D OBJECT TO THAT. 
12 MR. KUNZ: WAIT JUST A MOMENT. I'M REFERRING TO A 
13 CONVERSATION THAT OCCURRED THAT MRS. FISHER HAS PREVIOUSLY 
14 TESTIFIED TO. 
15 MR. BIRD: YOU'RE STATING THE SUBSTANCE OF IT AND I 
16 OBJECT TO IT AS LEADING. 
17 MR. KUNZ: I'LL WITHDRAW THAT QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. 
18 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, WAS THERE ANY CONVERSATION THAT 
19 EVEN RESEMBLED THE REPRESENTATION OF THE CONVERSATION THAT 
20 YOUR MOTHER GAVE EARLIER HERE ON THE STAND? 
21 A NO. 
22 Q WHAT DIFFERENT— 
23 A I MEAN, THEY WAS THERE. THEY WERE THERE. 
24 Q OKAY. DID YOUR FATHER ASK FOR PAYMENTS? 
25 1 A NO. 
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1 Q DID HE ASK FOR A RECORD OF PAYMENTS? 
2 A NO. 
3 Q WHAT DID HE SAY ABOUT PAYMENTS? 
4 A NOTHING, OTHER THAN—HE DIDN'T SAY NOTHING ABOUT THE 
5 PAYMENTS. I WAS THE ONE THAT MENTIONED HAVING TO MAKE THE 
6 PAYMENTS. AND HE SAYS WHEN I—AND HE ALWAYS MADE ME FEEL IN 
7 THIS WHOLE—IN THE LIFE OF THIS CONTRACT— 
8 I MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THIS AS A VOLUNTEER STATEMENT 
9 J AND INCOMPETENT. 
10 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) WELL, MAX, HOW DID YOUR FATHER MAKE 
11 YOU FEEL AS A RESULT OF THAT CONVERSATION? 
12 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THAT AS INCOMPETENT. IT'S 
13 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE— 
14 THE COURT: I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU MEAN BY 
15 INCOMPETENT. 
16 MR. BIRD: TO SAY HOW THE FATHER MADE HIM FEEL 
17 WITHOUT HIM BEING ABLE TO DESCRIBE IT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
18 DECEASED, I SUBMIT IT IS INCOMPETENT. IT JUST CAN'T BE DONE. 
19 THE COURT: I THINK WHAT THE QUESTION WAS IS HOW HE 
20 FELT, NOT HOW— 
21 MR. BIRD: NO, HOW DID HIS FATHER MAKE HIM FEEL. 
22 THE COURT: I'LL OVERRULE. I DON'T KNOW THAT IT'S 
23 EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER. HE CAN TESTIFY ABOUT HOW HE 
24 FELT ABOUT HIS FATHER AND ABOUT HIS FATHER'S ACTIONS MADE HIM 
25 I FEEL WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER. THE DIFFICULTY HE HAS IS 
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1 HE'S GOT TO TIE TO SOME ACTIONS. AND YOU DIDN'T DO THAT. 
2 MR. KUNZ: TIE IT TO SOME ACTIONS? 
3 THE COURT: YEAH. 
4 MR. KUNZ: WELL, LET ME GO BACK THEN AND I'LL 
5 REPHRASE MY LINE OF QUESTIONING. 
6 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX— 
7 THE COURT: IN OTHER WORDS— 
8 MR. KUNZ: OKAY. I'M SORRY. 
9 THE COURT: GO AHEAD. YOU MAY PROCEED. 
10 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT 
11 YOUR FATHER SAID ABOUT YOUR CONCERN FOR THE PAYMENTS OTHER 
12 THAN DON'T BUILD THE HOME—OR GO AHEAD AND BUILD THE HOME? 
13 A YES. 
14 Q WHAT DID HE SAY? 
15 A HE SAID TO THE AFFECT, "I WISHED YOU KIDS WOULD TRY 
16 TO APPRECIATE A LITTLE MORE WHAT WE'RE DOING FOR YOU THAN—I 
17 GUESS HE THOUGHT WE WAS ACTING KIND OF BITTER TOWARDS HIM OR 
18 SOMETHING, BUT HE MADE THE STATEMENT—MY FATHER MADE THAT 
19 STATEMENT THAT DAY. HE SAYS,—AND HE TURNED TO I AND THE WIFE 
20 AND SAYS, "I WISH YOU WOULD SHOW US A LITTLE MORE APPRECIATION 
21 TO WHAT WE'RE DOING—TRYING TO DO FOR YOU." 
22 Q OKAY. AND DID HE ELABORATE ON WHAT IT WAS HE WAS 
23 TRYING TO DO FOR YOU? 
24 A NO. 
25 Q OKAY. 
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1 A HE DIDN'T HAVE TO. 
2 Q WHAT DO YOU MEAN HE DIDN'T HAVE TO? 
3 A WELL, I COULD SEE IT. HE WASN'T FORCING"ME TO PAY 
4 FOR THE PLACE. 
5 Q OKAY. EARLIER YOU STATED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 
6 YOUR FATHER INDICATING— 
7 MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. I'VE GOT TO MOVE TO 
8 STRIKE THAT LAST STATEMENT BECAUSE IT'S NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
9 CONVERSATION THAT HE'S ALREADY GIVEN. 
10 THE COURT: I'LL OVERRULE THAT. HE CAN TESTIFY AS 
11 TO WHAT HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WERE. THERE ARE 
12 A LOT OF THINGS THAT ARE UNSTATED IN A CONVERSATION BASED UPON 
13 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES. HE CAN TESTIFY. THE 
14 COURT DOESN'T HAVE TO ACCEPT THEM. 
15 Q (3Y MR. KUNZ) MR. FISHER—EXCUSE ME—MAX, EARLIER 
16 YOU STATED THAT YOUR FATHER MADE SOME SORT OF COMMENT ABOUT 
17 "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT, I'LL GET THIS TAKEN CARE OF AS SOON AS 
18 I CAN." I'D LIKE YOU TO EXPLAIN THAT. EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID 
19 AND WHY HE SAID IT. 
20 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THAT. HE'S TESTIFIED TO WHAT 
21 HE SAID, IF HE HASN'T ALREADY DONE IT. BUT WHY HE SAID IT I 
22 SUBMIT IS INCOMPETENT; IT'S IN THE MIND OF THE SAYER. 
23 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. SUSTAINED AS TO WHY HE MAY 
24 HAVE SAID IT. THAT GOES BEYOND HIS KNOWLEDGE. 
25 I MR. KUNZ: THAT'S FINE. 
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1 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) WHAT DID HE SAY IN THAT REGARD? 
2 A YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK ME THE QUESTION AGAIN. I'VE GOT 
3 LOST NOW. 
4 Q OKAY. YOU PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT WHEN YOU INDICATED 
5 YOU COULD NOT BUILD A NEW HOME AND MAKE THE PAYMENTS, HE 
6 INDICATED SOMETHING—AND I'M TRYING NOT TO PUT WORDS IN YOUR 
7 MOUTH, BUT YOU SAID THAT HE SAID SOMETHING ABOUT DON'T WORRY 
8 ABOUT IT, I'LL GET THIS TAKEN CARE OF. 
9 I'D LIKE TO KNOW A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT THAT 
10 CONVERSATION. COULD YOU RELAY IT— 
11 MR. BIRD: I SUBMIT THAT HE'S ALREADY GIVEN THE 
12 CONVERSATION AND THIS IS REPETITION. 
13 MR. KUNZ: IT WASN'T CLEAR TO ME AND I BELIEVE WE 
14 WERE CUT OFF AT THE TIME, YOUR HONOR. 
15 THE COURT: OVERRULED. WHY DON'T YOU JUST ASK HIM 
16 IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE SAID THAT HE HASN'T TOLD US. 
17 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) OKAY. WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE SAID 
18 THAT YOU HAVEN'T PREVIOUSLY RELATED OR EXPLAINED? 
19 A NOT THAT I KNOW OF RIGHT NOW REGARDING—IF I 
20 UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION RIGHT—DID MY FATHER ASK ME ANYTHING 
21 OR DID WE HAVE ANY MORE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT THIS OR WHAT? 
22 J Q WELL, IT WASN'T CLEAR TO ME BECAUSE I BELIEVE WE 
23 WERE CUT OFF AT THE TIME, HOW YOU ANSWERED THE QUESTION OF 
24 WHAT YOUR FATHER'S RESPONSE WAS TO YOUR STATEMENT YOU COULDN'T 
25 (J MAKE ANY FURTHER PAYMENTS. AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW YOUR 
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1 FATHER RESPONDED. 
2 MR. BIRD: I SUBMIT HE'S ALREADY GIVEN THAT 
3 CONVERSATION. 
4 THE COURT: WELL, LET'S HAVE HIM GIVE IT. 
5 OVERRULED. 
6 THE WITNESS: MY FATHER—MY FATHER TOLD ME THAT I 
7 WAS TO GO AHEAD AND BUILD THE HOME—THE NEW HOME. THAT HE WAS 
8 I GOING TO HAVE THE REST OF THIS—TRY TO GET THE REST OF THESE 
9 AFFAIRS TAKEN CARE OF. THAT HE WOULDN'T NEED THESE—I 
10 WOULDN'T BE PRESSED TO MAKE THESE PAYMENTS. 
11 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DID HE ACTUALLY SAY YOU WOULD NOT BE 
12 PRESSED TO MAKE PAYMENTS? 
13 A NO, HE DIDN'T ACTUALLY SAY THAT I WOULDN'T BE 
14 PRESSED TO IT, BUT HE SAYS, "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT." HE SAYS, 
15 "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT." HE SAYS, "GO AHEAD AND BUILD THE NEW 
16 HOME." 
17 Q OKAY. 
18 A NO, HE NEVER TOLD ME NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT AND HE 
19 DIDN'T TELL ME HE RELIEVED ME OF— 
20 MR. BIRD: HE'S MAKING COMMENTS THAT ARE NOT IN THE 
21 CONVERSATION AND I OBJECT TO IT AND MOVE THAT THEY BE 
22 STRICKEN. 
23 THE COURT: OVERRULED. HE IS SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T 
24 SAY THOSE THINGS. 
25 J Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, AS A RESULT OF THAT CONVERSATION 
II 
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1 THAT YOU HAD WITH YOUR FATHER—DID YOUR MOTHER SAY ANYTHING, 
2 BY THE WAY, AT THAT TIME? 
3 A I DON'T RECALL HER EVER SAYING. 
4 Q YOU DON'T RECALL HER INDICATING ANYTHING? 
5 A (INAUDIBLE) 
6 Q OKAY. AS A RESULT OF THAT CONVERSATION THAT YOU HAD 
7 WITH YOUR PARENTS, WHAT THEN DID YOU DO WITH THE OLD HOUSE? 
8 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THAT QUESTION 
9 SAYING THAT IT'S CONSEQUENTIAL. IF HE WANTS TO TESTIFY AS TO 
10 WHAT HE DID, BUT I OBJECT TO HIS SAYING IT'S BECAUSE OF THAT 
11 CONVERSATION. 
12 THE COURT: YOU'RE CORRECT. SUSTAINED. 
13 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) SUBSEQUENT TO THAT CONVERSATION THAT 
14 YOU HAD WITH YOUR PARENTS, WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE OLD HOUSE? 
15 A I DESTROYED IT. 
16 Q AND— 
17 A LET ME REPHRASE THAT. I SALVAGED ALL THAT I COULD 
18 SALVAGE OUT OF IT, WHICH WAS—WELL, I SALVAGED AND THEN I 
19 DESTROYED. 
20 Q OKAY. AND THEN WHAT DID YOU DO THEREAFTER? 
21 A WE WENT TO PROCEEDING TO BUILD A NEW HOME. 
22 Q AND HAVE YOU COMPLETED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW 
23 HOME? 
24 A JUST ABOUT. NOT COMPLETELY. 
25 J Q AND— 
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1 A BUT WE LIVE IN THE NEW HOME. 
2 Q DO YOU OWE ANYONE ANY MONEY FOR THE COST OF 
3 CONSTRUCTING THAT HOME? 
4 I A I DO. 
5 Q HOW MUCH DO YOU OWE? 
6 A I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY. $30,000. 
7 Q OKAY. WHERE DID YOU RESIDE DURING THE TIME PERIOD 
8 THAT THE OLD HOME WAS DEMOLISHED AND THE NEW HOME WAS BUILT? 
9 A I RESIDED AT MY FATHER-IN-LAW'S PLACE IN ALTAMONT. 
10 Q OKAY. AND DID YOUR FATHER OR MOTHER EVER COME BY 
11 AND OVERSEE THE DEMOLITION AND NEW CONSTRUCTION? 
12 A MY FATHER DID. I DON'T RECALL MY MOTHER BEING 
13 THERE, BUT MY FATHER DID, YES. 
14 Q OKAY. MAX, DO YOU RECALL EVER HAVING CONVERSATION 
15 WITH YOUR MOTHER AT THE CEMETERY OVER IN VERNAL WHEN ONE OF 
16 YOUR RELATIVE'S BABY WAS BEING BURIED? 
17 A I SURE DO. 
18 Q AND COULD YOU RELATE YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE 
19 CONVERSATION THAT OCCURRED? 
20 A WE WERE AT THE GRAVESIDE FOR THAT LITTLE BOY AND IT 
21 WAS—THE GRAVE HAD BEEN DEDICATED. IT WAS OVER. THE CEREMONY 
22 WAS OVER. AND WE WERE TO GO TO LEAVE FOR A DINNER AT THE 
23 CHAPEL IN VERNAL AND WE WERE—I AND MY WIFE WERE SITTING IN MY 
24 PICKUP— 
25 j Q WAIT JUST A MOMENT BEFORE YOU PROCEED. 
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j I DO YOU RECALL WHEN THAT OCCURRED? 
2 A NOT EXACTLY, NO. 
3 Q OKAY. COULD YOU TRY AND TIE IT IN RELATIONSHIP TO 
4 THE DEMOLITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME ON THE RANCH? WAS 
5 IT BEFORE OR AFTER? 
6 A IT WAS AFTER. 
7 Q AFTER THE DEMOLITION OF THE HOME? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q AND GO AHEAD AND PROCEED. 
LO A AND WE W E R E — T H E CEREMONY WAS OVER AND WE WERE 
LI SITTING IN THE PICKUP WAITING FOR THE TRAFFIC TO GO. AND I 
L2 HAD THE WINDOW DOWN AND MOTHER COME UP AND GRABBED MY ARM AND 
L3 SAYS, "MAX," SHE SAYS, "WHAT IN THE WORLD IS THE MATTER WITH 
L4 YOUR KIDS. WHAT HAVE WE EVER DONE THAT YOUR CHILDREN DON'T 
t5 STOP AND VISIT?" 
L6 I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT COME ABOUT. AND I SAYS, 
.7 "MOTHER," I SAYS, "THIS IS NOT RIGHT." I SAYS, "THAT IS 
8 BETWEEN MY CHILDREN AND YOURSELF." 
9 SHE SAYS—AND SHE TOLD ME, SHE SAYS, "WELL, YOU'RE 
20 THE CAUSE OF THE FRICTION BETWEEN US AND YOUR CHILDREN." 
21 AND THAT WAS THE CONVERSATION. 
22 Q OKAY. DID SHE STATE ANYTHING TO YOU REGARDING 
23 PAYMENTS FOR THE PROPERTY? 
24 A NO. 



























A ME AND MY WIFE AT THE TIME WHEN SHE DONE THIS. 
Q WAS ANYONE ELSE WITH YOUR MOTHER? 
A NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. MAX, DID YOU HAVE ANY OTHER CONVERSATION 
WITH YOUR FATHER PRIOR TO HIS DEATH REGARDING THE PAYMENTS, 
AFTER THE CONVERSATION AT YOUR HOME—OR THE OLD HOME WHEN IT 
WAS BEING DEMOLISHED? 
A NO. 
Q DID YOUR FATHER EVER ASK YOU FOR A PAYMENT ON THE 
RANCH? 
A NO. 
Q HAS YOUR MOTHER EVER ASKED YOU FOR A PAYMENT ON THE 
RANCH? 
A NOT PREVIOUS TO MY FATHER'S DEATH. AFTER, YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. SO YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THEN IS 
SHE HAS ASKED FOR PAYMENT? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. AND WHEN DID SHE FIRST ASK FOR PAYMENT FOR 
THE RANCH? 
A I WOULD SAY ROUGHLY A YEAR AFTER FATHER PASSING. 
Q OKAY. AND HOW DID SHE ASK YOU? 
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW WHEN THAT WAS. 
MR. KUNZ: I THINK MRS. FISHER TESTIFIED AT THE 
BEGINNING OF HER TESTIMONY THAT GEORGE DIED—I WROTE DOWN 
APRIL 18TH, 1992. 
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1 THE COURT: OKAY. 
2 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) OKAY. COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHEN IT WAS 
3 THAT SHE FIRST ASKED YOU FOR A PAYMENT? 
4 A '93. 
5 Q OKAY. 
6 A ABOUT A YEAR AFTER MY FATHER'S PASSING. 
7 Q NOW, SHE TESTIFIED THAT AFTER YOUR FATHER PASSED 
8 AWAY THAT THE FAMILY MET TOGETHER WITH PAUL BARTON AND THE 
9 MATTER WAS DISCUSSED; DO YOU RECALL THAT? 
10 A YOU BET. 
11 Q AND— 
12 A NO, NO, NO, NOT THE FAMILY. THEY WERE FOUR OF US. 
13 Q OKAY. WHO WAS PRESENT? 
14 A THERE WAS MYSELF, MY MOTHER, MY BROTHER BRENT, AND 
1-5 MY SISTER SUSAN. 
16 Q OKAY. AND WHERE DID THAT MEETING TAKE PLACE? 
17 A IK BARTON'S OFFICE OR WHATEVER IT IS THERE IN SALT 
18 LAKE. 
19 Q OKAY. AND DO YOU RECALL ANY DISCUSSION GOING BACK 
20 AND FORTH AT THAT TIME ABOUT YOUR NEED TO PAY FOR THE RANCH? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q AND IS THAT THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU SAY YOUR MOTHER 
23 ASKED YOU FOR PAYMENTS? 
24 A YES. 
25 I Q OKAY. DO YOU RECALL RECEIVING THE NOTICE OF 
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1 I TERMINATION IN THE MAIL? 
2 A IT WASN'T—IT WASN'T DELIVERED BY MAIL, IT WAS 
3 DELIVERED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
4 Q YOU SAY LAW ENFORCEMENT DELIVERED IT TO YOU? 
5 A YES, IT WAS HAND DELIVERED. 
6 Q AND WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER RECEIVING THAT NOTICE? 
7 A WELL, AFTER I GOT THROUGH SHAKING I WENT LOOKING FOR 
8 SOME HELP. 
9 Q AND DID YOU FIND HELP? 
10 A I HOPE. 
11 Q WHAT DID YOU DO IN REGARD TO FINDING SOME HELP? 
12 A THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT I DONE. THAT'S WHAT I DONE. 
13 WHEN I SEEN THAT I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. I DON'T KNOW THE 
14 LAW. I HAVEN'T STUDIED THE LAW AND I FELT THAT AT THAT TIME 
15 IN MY LIFE I NEEDED SOME HELP. 
16 Q OKAY. NOW, MAX, PRIOR TO YOUR RECEIVING THAT 
17 NOTICE, YOU HAD MET ME; ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
18 A NO, I HADN'T MET YOU BEFORE THAT NOTICE. 
19 Q IF—WELL, LET'S GO BACK. 
20 WHEN DO YOU RECALL FIRST MEETING ME? 
21 A I CAN'T— 
22 MR. BIRD: I DON'T SEE THE MATERIALITY OF THIS. I 
23 RECOGNIZE THAT HE'S EMPLOYED MR. KUNZ, BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT 
24 THE BACKGROUND IS MATERIAL. 
25 J MR. KUNZ: THE ONLY MATERIALITY I WISH TO OFFER, 
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1 YOUR HONOR, IS IT'S CLEAR THAT I WAS REPRESENTING MAX AND 
2 JOYCE PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT THIS NOTICE WAS RECEIVED. MY 
3 NAME IS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE NOTICE AND I OF COURSE RESPONDED 
4 TO IT INDICATING IN THE COURSE THAT THE DOCUMENT SPEAKS FOR 
5 ITSELF AND THAT I'VE HAD CONTINUAL CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. 
6 BARTON— 
7 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION THAT HE WAS 
8 ALREADY INVOLVED BEFORE THE NOTICE? 
9 J MR. KUNZ: I'M JUST TRYING TO REFRESH HIS MEMORY 
10 I THAT WE WERE INVOLVED BEFORE THAT TIME IS ALL. 
11 MR. BIRD: WELL, I RECOGNIZE THAT—WELL, GO AHEAD. 
12 THE COURT: I THINK MR. BIRD'S POINT IS WHAT 
13 DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE. 
14 MR. KUNZ: WELL, I JUST DIDN'T WANT TO DISCREDIT MY 
15 EXHIBITS. 
16 THE COURT: WE RECOGNIZE— 
17 MR. BIRD: THERE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PAUL 
18 BARTON AND MR. KUNZ, I KNOW THAT. BUT— 
19 THE COURT: BEFORE THE NOTICE WAS SENT. 
20 MR. BIRD: BEFORE THE NOTICE WAS SENT, BUT I CAN'T 
21 SEE THE MATERIALITY OF IT. 
22 THE COURT: I CAN'T, EITHER. 
23 MR. KUNZ: LET ME JUST SUFFICE BY— 
24 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, IS IT SAFE TO SAY—AFTER HEARING 
25 1 THIS CONVERSATION, ISN'T IT SAFE TO SAY THAT I WAS HIRED PRIOR 
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1 I TO THE TIME THAT YOU ACTUALLY RECEIVED THAT NOTICE TO 
2 REPRESENT YOU? 
3 A WELL, IT COULD BE, YES. I THOUGHT IT WAS AFTER, BUT 
4 I COULD BE WRONG. 
5 Q OKAY. MAX, AFTER— 
6 1 A I DON'T KNOW WHEN IT WAS DONE AND HOW IT WAS DONE. 
7 I Q AND AFTER YOU RECEIVED THE NOTICE AND YOU CAME TO 
8 ME, DID YOU INSTRUCT ME T O — 
9 MR. KUNZ: WHERE IS DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 6? 
10 J Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DID YOU INSTRUCT ME TO RESPOND IN 
11 YOUR BEHALF? 
12 A YES. 
13 Q AND I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS 
14 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 6 AND ASK YOU IF YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THAT 
15 DOCUMENT. 
16 A YES. 
17 Q AND DID YOU CONSIDER THAT A RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE, 
18 THEN? 
19 A YES. 
20 J Q DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU NEEDED TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER 
21 OTHER THAN—AFTER I HAD SENT THAT NOTICE? 
22 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THAT AS INCOMPETENT, CALLING 
23 HOW HE FELT. 
24 J THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
J5 I THE WITNESS: NOW, RESTATE YOUR QUESTION. 
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1 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU NEEDED TO 
2 RESPOND FURTHER TO YOUR MOTHER AND YOUR BROTHER WHO WERE 
3 ACTING AS TRUSTEES OTHER THAN THE RESPONSE THAT I MADE IN YOUR 
4 BEHALF? 
5 A I DON'T KNOW HOW TO ANSWER THAT. DID YOU FEEL—DID 
6 I FEEL THAT I SHOULD? 
7 Q RIGHT. YOU PERSONALLY. 
8 A I FELT THAT I HIRED YOU TO DO THAT. 
9 Q OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
10 A I DIDN'T FEEL THAT I COULD RESPOND. 
11 Q ALL RIGHT. MAX, YOU PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THAT AT 
12 THE TIME YOU MET WITH YOUR FATHER AND MOTHER IN '88 OR '89 
13 DURING THE DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOME THAT YOU FELT YOU OWED 
14 YOUR PARENTS SOME MONEY? 
15 A YES. 
16 Q AND DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU STILL OWED THEM MONEY AT 
17 THE TIME THAT YOU HIRED ME TO RESPOND TO THAT NOTICE? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q AND THIS NOTICE SETS FORTH AN AMOUNT OF $57,100, I 
20 BELIEVE. DO YOU FEEL THAT THAT AT THE TIME WAS A PROPER 
21 AMOUNT? 
22 MR. BIRD: I OBJECT TO THIS QUESTION. THE WITNESS 
23 HAS ALREADY SAID HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE LAW, HE HIRED A 
24 LAWYER AND RELIED ON HIM AND I ASSUME IT'S THE LAWYER'S 
25 OPINION AND I OBJECT TO IT AS BEING INCOMPETENT FROM THIS 
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1 I WITNESS. 
2 THE COURT: WE DON'T KNOW THAT. OVERRULED. 
3 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) MAX, DID YOU DISCUSS AN AMOUNT THAT 
4 YOU FELT THAT WAS LEGITIMATELY OWED WITH ME AS YOUR ATTORNEY? 
5 A YES, WE TALKED ABOUT IT. YES. 
6 Q AND WHAT WAS YOUR HONEST OPINION AT THE TIME AS TO 
7 THE AMOUNT THAT WAS OWED TO YOUR PARENTS? 
8 A THIS FIGURE, THIS $57,000. 
9 Q MAX, DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME FROM 1974 UP UNTIL 
10 THE TIME YOUR FATHER PASSED AWAY, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR 
11 RELATIONSHIP? 
12 A I WOULD DESCRIBE MY RELATIONSHIP REAL WELL WITH MY 
13 FATHER, EXCEPT ON OCCASION. 
14 Q OKAY. AND DID THAT ONE OCCASION HAVE ANYTHING TO DO 
15 WITH THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND YOUR PURCHASE OF THE RANCH? 
16 A NO. 
17 Q AND WHEN DID THAT OCCASION OCCUR? 
18 A I DON'T— 
19 Q IF YOU DON'T KNOW, THAT'S FINE. 
20 A I DON'T KNOW. 
21 Q DID YOU AND YOUR FATHER EVER DO BUSINESS TOGETHER 
22 DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME, 1974 UP UNTIL HIS DEATH? 
23 A YES. 
24 J Q WHAT KIND OF BUSINESS DID YOU DO TOGETHER? 
2 5
 | A WE GOT IN—PUT IT THIS WAY, WE GOT IN TROUBLE WITH 
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1 SOME BAD MONEY. I CALL IT BAD MONEY. WE SOLD SOME CATTLE AND 
2 THE FELLOW THAT BOUGHT THE CATTLE WAS AN ANDREASON THAT RUN 
3 THE SALE BARN IN ROOSEVELT AND WE WERE BOTH STUCK WITH SOME 
4 BAD MONIES. I WAS STUCK WITH A LOT OF BAD MONEY. TO ME IT 
5 WAS A LOT OF BAD MONEY. 
6 Q YOU SAY "BAD MONEY," WAS IT CHECKS— 
7 A THE CHECKS WERE NO GOOD. JUST NO GOOD. 
8 Q SO IT WAS BAD CHECKS? 
9 A YES, IT WAS BAD CHECKS. MY FATHER WAS STUCK WITH A 
10 SUM, TOO. IT WAS A SMALLER AMOUNT. AND WE WENT TOGETHER AND 
11 HIRED—FOUND US AN ATTORNEY AND IT WAS A FELLOW OVER IN PRICE. 
12 Q OKAY. WHEN DID THAT OCCUR? 
13 A LET'S SEE, '79—ABOUT AROUND '81. I BELIEVE IT WAS 
14 '81. BETWEEN '81 AND '82, I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHEN IT WAS. 
15 I MEAN, I WOULD SAY—IF I RECALL IT RIGHT I RECALL IT WOULD BE 
16 '81. IT COULD'VE BEEN '80, BUT IT WAS RIGHT IN THAT AREA. 
17 Q OKAY. AND DID YOU DO OTHER BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
18 WITH YOUR FATHER? 
19 A WELL, I DONE WHAT HE ASKED. IF HE NEEDED HELP, I 
20 TRIED TO HELP HIM. OR AS FAR AS MONEY TRANSACTIONS I— 
21 Q DID YOU EVER—DID YOUR FATHER EVER ASK YOU TO COME 
22 AND PERFORM LABOR ON HIS BEHALF— 
23 A OH, YES. YES. 
24 Q —DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME? 
25 A YES. I 
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1 Q AND WHEN WAS THAT? 
2 A ALL DIFFERENT TIMES. ALL DIFFERENT TIMES. 
3 Q COULD YOU DESCRIBE THOSE THAT YOU RECALL? 
4 A ALL OF IT. THERE WAS TIMES THAT THEY WANTED A FENCE 
5 BUILT AROUND THEIR YARD. AND THEY WANTED CORRALS ACROSS FROM 
6 WHERE THEY LIVED. AND THERE WAS TIMES THAT HE WAS DOING 
7 DIFFERENT WORKS WHERE WE CALL THE RANCH, THAT'S THE PLACE 
8 BELOW MOON LAKE. THERE WAS WATER SYSTEMS THAT WENT IN THERE 
9 AND THEY BUILT THEM A CABIN UP THERE. AND I WENT UP AND TRIED 
10 TO HELP ON THAT. AND I TRIED TO DO WHAT I THOUGHT THAT I 
11 SHOULD DO AS A SON FOR A FATHER. 
12 Q OKAY. 
13 A HE CAME UP. HE WAS WELCOME—HE KNEW HE WAS WELCOME 
14 TO EVERYTHING WE HAD. 
15 Q AND DID HE COME UP AND USE YOUR THINGS? 
16 A NOT EXTENSIVELY, NO. HE'D COME UP AND USE A HORSE. 
17 AND I USED A HORSE OF HIS AND RUINED HIM. ONE TIME I BORROWED 
18 A HORSE FROM DAD AND RUINED HIM. 
19 Q HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF 
20 TIME YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR MOTHER? 
21 I  A AWFUL DAMN HARD. 
22 Q WHY WOULD YOU DESCRIBE IT AS HARD? 
23 A I DON'T KNOW. 
24 MR. KUNZ: ONE MOMENT, PLEASE, YOUR HONOR. 
25 J I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER OF THE WITNESS AT THIS TIME. I 
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1 II THE WITNESS: CAN I BE EXCUSED FOR A MINUTE? 
2 THE COURT: YES. JUST BRIEFLY. 
3 BE BACK ON THE RECORD. 
4 I ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY CROSS EXAMINE, MR. BIRD. 
5 I MR. BIRD: THANK YOU. 
6 1 
7 1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. BIRD: 
9 Q YOU SAY YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR MOTHER WAS HARD; 
10 IS THAT THE WORD YOU USED? 
11 A VERY HARD. 
12 Q COULD YOU DESCRIBE IT IN DETAIL. WHAT WAS THE 
13 PROBLEM? 
14 A I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. 
15 Q WHEN DID IT START? 
16 A PROBABLY THE TIME I GOT MARRIED. 
17 Q WHEN WAS THAT? 
18 A '60. 1960 OF NOVEMBER. 
19 Q NOW, IN 1974 SHE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU FOR 
20 THE SALE OF PROPERTY. WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BAD AT THAT TIME? 
21 A WELL, IT NEVER WAS REAL BAD, BUT WE NEVER HAD A REAL 
22 CLOSE RELATIONSHIP. NO, WE NEVER HAD A REAL BAD RELATIONSHIP, 
23 BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE WHAT YOU CALL A REAL CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, 
24 EITHER. WE NEVER HAD A TERRIBLE BAD RELATIONSHIP, NO. 




























JAMES J. OMAN. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS 
MATTER, AFTER HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND 
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KUNZ: 
Q MR. OMAN, WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND 
PLACE OF RESIDENCE. 
A JAMES J. OMAN, BLUFFDALE, UTAH. 
THE COURT: JUST A SECOND. O-M-A-N? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
Q (BY MR. KUNZ) AND, MR. OMAN, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH 
MAX AND JOYCE FISHER? 
A YES. 
Q ARE YOU ALSO FAMILIAR WITH LARUE FISHER? 
A YES. 
Q AND DID YOU KNOW GEORGE FISHER PRIOR TO HIS PASSING 
AWAY? 
A EVER SINCE I WAS IN THE 5TH GRADE. 
Q YOU KNEW GEORGE EVER SINCE YOU WERE IN 5TH GRADE? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q OKAY. SO YOU LIVE OUT IN BLUFFDALE, BUT YOU USED TO 
LIVE OUT HERE? 
A YES, WE LIVED IN ALTONAH FOR SEVEN YEARS. WE HELPED 
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1 HELENE'S BROTHER ON THE RANCH THERE AFTER HIS WIFE DIED. 
2 Q NOW, IS THAT SEVEN YEARS RECENTLY OR WHEN YOU WERE 
3 A CHILD? 
4 MR. BIRD: WOULD YOU MAKE THAT STATEMENT AGAIN, I 
5 DIDN'T HEAR IT. 
6 THE WITNESS: WE MOVED BACK TO ALTONAH IN 1980 UNTIL 
7 '87. 
8 MR. BIRD: THEN YOU SAID SOMETHING ABOUT A RANCH; 
9 WHAT DID YOU SAY? 
10 THE WITNESS: WE HELPED HELENE'S BROTHER ON THE 
11 RANCH AFTER HIS WIFE DIED, THAT'S WHY WE COME BACK TO ALTONAH. 
12 MR. BIRD: HELENE? 
13 THE WITNESS: HELENE, H-E-L-E-N-E. 
14 Q (BY MR. KUNZ) AND DURING THAT SEVEN YEARS THAT YOU 
15 LIVED OUT HERE, DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REKINDLE YOUR 
16 FRIENDSHIP WITH MR. GEORGE FISHER? 
17 A YES. 
18 Q AND HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
19 GEORGE FISHER AT THAT TIME? 
20 A VERY GOOD. WE WERE HOME TEACHERS FOR SEVERAL YEARS 
21 AND WENT THROUGH THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOSPEL PRINCIPALS 
22 WITH THEM. THEY WERE PREPARING TO GO TO THE TEMPLE AND WE 
23 WERE HELPING THEM. 
24 Q WHEN YOU SAY "WE" IS THAT YOU AND YOUR WIFE? 



























Q AND YOU WERE WORKING WITH GEORGE AND LARUE, I TAKE 
IT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q AND DID YOU CONSIDER GEORGE AND LARUE YOUR FRIENDS? 
A YES. 
Q AND WERE THEY REAL GOOD FRIENDS OR CASUAL FRIENDS OR 
JUST CHURCH ACQUAINTANCES? 
A WELL, I THOUGHT THEY WERE GOOD FRIENDS. 
Q OKAY. YOU WOULD CONSIDER THEM GOOD FRIENDS? 
A YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND HOW DID YOU GET TO KNOW MAX? 
A WELL, WE WERE NEIGHBORS. WHERE THEY LIVED WAS JUST 
A SHORT DISTANCE FROM OUR PLACE. 
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU EVER—WELL, FIRST OF ALL, LET ME 
ASK YOU, WHEN YOU DECIDED TO MOVE OR LEAVE ALTONAH, DID YOU 
EVER HAVE DISCUSSION WITH MAX ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS 
BUYING YOUR HOME AND ACREAGE THERE IN ALTONAH? 
A YES. 
Q AND HOW WOULD YOU HAVE VIEWED THE MARKET AT THAT 
TIME AS FAR AS YOUR ABILITY TO SELL YOUR HOME? 
A WELL, WE WEREN'T PARTICULARLY WANTING TO SELL THE 
PLACE. WE'D KIND TO LIKE TO KEEP IT AS A SUMMER HOME MORE OR 
LESS AND WE WEREN'T TOO MUCH INTERESTED IN SELLING AT THAT 
TIME. 
Q WOULD YOU HAVE SOLD IT TO MAX? 
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1 A WELL, PROBABLY. 
2 Q EXCUSE ME? 
3 A I THINK SO IF HE'D PURSUED IT. 
4 Q AND YOU DID HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM ABOUT 
5 PURCHASING IT? 
6 A WELL, YEAH, HE THOUGHT HE'D LIKE THE PLACE FOR HIS 
7 SON-IN-LAW AND DAUGHTER TO LIVE. 
8 Q OKAY. BUT DID HE EVER TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF 
9 HIS PURCHASING THE HOME TO LIVE IN IT RATHER THAN DEMOLISHING 
10 THE OLD HOME ON THE RANCH? 
11 A NO. 
12 Q NEVER DISCUSSED IT WITH YOU? 
13 A NOT THAT I RECALL. 
14 Q OKAY. BUT WAS YOUR PLACE FOR SALE AROUND THAT 
15 PARTICULAR TIME? 
16 A NO. 
17 Q IT WAS NOT. WHEN DID YOU TRY AND SELL YOUR HOME? 
18 A WE DIDN'T TRY AND SELL IT. A COUPLE APPROACHED US 
19 ON BUYING IT. WE HAD IT LEASED. AND A COUPLE APPROACHED US 
20 AND WE SET A PRICE AND WE SET IT UP WHERE WE THOUGHT THEY 
21 MIGHT NOT BUY IT, BUT THEY TOOK IT. 
22 Q BUT AT WHAT TIME DID YOU LEASE THE PROPERTY WHEN YOU 
23 MOVED FROM THE AREA? 
24 A WHEN WE MOVED IN—IT WAS '87. 
25 J Q '87. AND SO AFTER THAT--
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! A OR '88. 
2 1 Q '88? 
3 A UH HUH. 
4 Q ALL RIGHT. MR. OMAN, AT ANY POINT IN TIME DID YOU 
5 BECOME AWARE OF A PROBLEM BETWEEN MAX AND JOYCE AND GEORGE AND 
6 LARUE REGARDING THE PURCHASE BY MAX OF THE FARM AND RANCH THAT 
7 HE LIVED ON? 
8 A YES, WE WERE AWARE OF THAT. 
9 Q HOW DID YOU BECOME AWARE OF IT? 
10 A WELL, I GUESS BY TALKING TO MAX AND TALKING TO 
11 GEORGE AND LARUE. 
12 Q OKAY. AND WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
13 PROBLEM? 
14 A WELL, IT WAS DISCUSSED AT LEAST TWICE WHILE WE WERE-
15 -WHEN WE WERE MAKING OUR VISITS WITH GEORGE AND LARUE. AND IT 
16 WAS BROUGHT UP THAT MAX HADN'T MADE ANY PAYMENTS. AND LARUE 
17 SAID, "I THINK WE SHOULD PUSH THAT AND GET THE PAYMENTS, PLUS 
18 INTEREST ON THE PAYMENTS." 
19 Q AND WHAT WAS GEORGE'S REACTION? 
20 A HE SAID, "I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD CHARGE INTEREST ON 
•21 IT." 
22 Q OKAY. DID HE EVER INDICATE A DESIRE TO FORCE MAX 
23 INTO PAYING? 
24 A NO. 
25 MR. BIRD: JUST A MINUTE. I OBJECT TO THAT AS 
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LEADING AND ASK THAT HE GIVE THE CONVERSATION ONLY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU GET TO A NEGATIVE 
OTHER THAN ASK THAT KIND OF QUESTION. 
MR. BIRD: WELL, BY ASKING WHAT THE CONVERSATION 
WAS. 
THE COURT: ASK HIM TO RELATE THE ENTIRE 
CONVERSATION, COUNSEL. 
Q (BY MR. KUNZ) COULD YOU RELATE THE ENTIRE 
CONVERSATIONS IN THIS REGARD. 
A WE KNEW THE SITUATION AND WE--
Q WHEN YOU SAY "WE" ARE YOU STILL REFERRING TO YOU AND 
YOUR WIFE— 
A ME AND MY WIFE, YES. 
Q OKAY. 
A AND IF ANYTHING WOULD HAPPEN TO GEORGE THAT THERE 
WOULD BE PROBLEMS. WE WERE AWARE OF THAT. AND WE WERE TRYING 
TO GET—PUSHING A LITTLE BIT ON BOTH OF THEM TO TRY TO GET IT 
SETTLED—YOU KNOW—WHILE— 
Q WERE YOU ACTING AS A MEDIATOR? 
A PARDON? 
Q WERE YOU ACTING AS A MEDIATOR TRYING TO GET— 
A THAT'S WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO DO. 
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU HAVE ANY SUCCESS? 
A NO. 



























A WELL, BECAUSE OF PRIDE AND TEMPERS, I THINK. THEY 
JUST COULDN'T TALK. 
Q EXCUSE ME? 
A BECAUSE OF PRIDE AND TEMPERS. THEY COULDN'T TALK 
ABOUT IT. THEY COULDN'T DISCUSS IT. 
Q "THEY" MEANING MAX AND JOYCE AND GEORGE AND LARUE? 
A WELL, I THINK IT WAS MOSTLY BETWEEN MAX AND HIS 
MOTHER. GEORGE HE KIND OF STAYED CLEAR. 
Q GEORGE STAYED CLEAR. OTHER THAN YOUR PREVIOUS 
STATEMENT THAT MAX HAD INDICATED HE DIDN'T THINK THAT THERE 
SHOULD BE ANY INTEREST CHARGED, DID YOU WITNESS ANY OTHER 
CONVERSATIONS OR DO YOU RECALL ANY OTHER WORDS THAT GEORGE 
SAID SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO MAX PAYING THE DEBT? 
A HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE DEBT. THE ONLY 
THING I HEARD HIM SAY WAS--LARUE SAYS WE SHOULD HAVE THE FULL 
PAYMENT, PLUS INTEREST, AND GEORGE SAYS, "I_ DON'T THINK WE 
SHOULD CHARGE INTEREST." 
Q OKAY. THAT'S WHAT YOU— 
A I HEARD HIM SAY THAT TWICE. 
Q YOU HEARD HIM SAY IT TWICE? 
A RIGHT. 
Q AND DID YOU SENSE THAT THIS WAS A SORE SPOT BETWEEN 
GEORGE AND LARUE? 
A THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. IT WAS. 
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU ELECT NOT TO PURSUE ANY FURTHER 
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1 OR DID YOU TRY TO PURSUE IT FURTHER AFTER THAT TIME? 
2 A NO. NO, WE DIDN'T. IT WAS REALLY NOT OUR AFFAIRS 
3 JUST AS NEIGHBORS WE JUST WANTED TO SEE IT SETTLED. 
4 Q BECAUSE YOU HATED TO SEE IT COME TO THIS; IS THAT 
5 CORRECT? 
6 A RIGHT. I HATED TO SEE IT COME TO A COURT TRIAL 
7 BECAUSE THAT'S—THE ONLY WINNERS HERE ARE THE ATTORNEYS. 
8 Q WELL, THANK YOU, MR. OMAN, I APPRECIATE THAT. 
9 MR. KUNZ: YOUR WITNESS. 
10 
11 CROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. BIRD; 
13 Q THIS CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE IN THE HOME OF GEORGE 
14 AND LARUE OR WAS IT IN MAX'S HOME? 
15 A IT WAS IN GEORGE AND LARUE'S HOME. 
16 Q AND YOU SAY MAX WAS THERE? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q MAX WAS NOT THERE? 
19 A NO. 
20 Q SO HE WASN'T PARTY TO THIS— 
21 A NO. 
22 Q —AND HE DIDN'T—YOU DIDN'T HEAR ANY COMMENT FROM 
23 HIM BECAUSE HE WASN'T THERE? 
24 A RIGHT. 
25 Q THIS IS PURELY BETWEEN THE FOUR OF YOU? 
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1 A RIGHT. 
2 Q DID YOU EVER DISCUSS THIS WITH MAX? 
3 A YES. 
4 Q DID YOU DISCUSS IT LATER WITH LARUE? 
5 A NO, I DON'T THINK WE EVER TALKED TO JUST LARUE OTHER 
6 THAN WHEN GEORGE WAS THERE ABOUT IT. 
7 Q AT THAT TIME? 
8 A RIGHT. 
9 MR. BIRD: THAT'S ALL. 
10 MR. KUNZ: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
11 WE'D LIKE TO CALL HELENE OMAN. 
12 THE COURT: MAY THIS WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
13 MR. KUNZ: HE MAY. 
14 MR. BIRD: YES. 
15 
16 HELENE J. OMAN, 
17 CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS 
18 MATTER, AFTER HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND 
19 TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
20 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. KUNZ: 
23 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME. 
24 A HELENE J. OMAN. 
25 Q AND, MRS. OMAN, YOU ARE MARRIED TO JAMES OMAN? 
I 
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